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Introduction 
Three shots rang out in the early morning of October 22, 1970, in the middle of 
Santiago, Chile.1 General René Schneider was the intended target of a kidnapping attempt, 
but the operation quickly went sour when General Schneider took out his own gun to 
protect himself. The intended kidnappers reacted by shooting at him as he sat in the 
backseat of his car, and two shots pierced his hand while the third lodged in his chest. 
Although rushed to the hospital, he died three days later from his wounds. Chileans were in 
shock at the death of the commander-in-chief of the military, and United States President 
Richard Nixon quickly sent his condolences to Chilean President Eduardo Frei. Yet 
President Frei was completely unaware that officials within the Nixon White House were 
the ones who encouraged and provided financial and strategic support to the kidnappers.2 
Chilean General René Schneider was the commander-in-chief of the Chilean army, 
a respected military official, and staunch constitutionalist who, despite political 
differences, supported the Congressional ratification of socialist Salvador Allende as 
president of Chile after his election in 1970.3 Yet support of Allende was not unanimous 
throughout the military, and in an attempt to thwart his assumption of the presidency 
various military officials began plotting to stop his electoral ratification. The US, acting 
through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), provided financial and strategic aid to 
various groups who it identified as potentially successful coup plotters. On October 22, 
                                                          
1 Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: New 
Press, 2013), 28; the title quote “Keeping the US hand well hidden” from: From United States. Central 
Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Plans. Western Hemisphere Division to unknown, “[Policy to Overthrow 
Salvador Allende by Coup],” cable, 16 October 1970, Chile and the United States, DNSA accession number 
CL00258. 
2 Ibid., 22. 
3 Ibid. 
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1970, a group led by Chilean General Roberto Viaux attempted to kidnap General 
Schneider, but his unexpected resistance led to his assailants assassinating him instead. 
The impact of General Schneider’s death in the US did not end with his 
assassination in 1970. In subsequent years, the death of General Schneider was on the 
minds of the executive and legislative branches. Beginning with congressional inquiries in 
1975, President Gerald Ford faced questions from Congress and the US press about covert 
intelligence activities in Chile surrounding the election and presidency of Salvador 
Allende. One example of these covert intelligence activities in Chile was US involvement 
in the plot to kidnap General Schneider. This became part of a greater moment of public 
and congressional demands for accountability by the White House and the intelligence 
agencies.  
In 1975, Congress addressed questions surrounding covert activities that the CIA 
conducted in the US and around the world from the 1960s until the 1970s with the 
formation of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect 
to Intelligence Activities.4 Chaired by Senator Frank Church, an Idaho Democrat, the 
committee became known as the Church Committee. The Church Committee focused its 
investigations on the actions and misconduct of the intelligence agencies and the White 
House from the 1960s to 1975.5 One aspect of the Church Committee’s wide-reaching 
investigation into the intelligence agencies was alleged US involvement in assassination 
plots involving foreign leaders. 
                                                          
4 Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry Revisited: The Church Committee Confronts America’s Spy Agencies 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 2. 
5 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders Interim Report. 94th Cong., 1st sess., 
1975, S. Rep. 94-465, 2. 
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The plot to kidnap General Schneider and his subsequent assassination was not the 
only assassination plot involving a foreign leader in Latin America that the US government 
participated in. In fact, plots to kidnap or assassinate foreign leaders with alleged US 
covert involvement occurred around the world from the 1960s to 1970. Between 1961 and 
1970, the CIA considered the possibility of kidnapping or assassinating at least five foreign 
leaders: Patrice Lumumba of Congo, Fidel Castro of Cuba, Rafael Trujillo of the 
Dominican Republic, Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, and General René Schneider of 
Chile. All but Fidel Castro were victims of plots and assassinations that the US played at 
least a minimal role in. The Church Committee’s investigation of the US’ role in the deaths 
of these five foreign leaders formed its report Alleged Assassination Plots Involving 
Foreign Leaders, released in 1975.6 
A literature review of the existing works in the areas of US covert involvement in 
Chile and congressional investigation into covert activities by the US intelligence agencies 
demonstrates the lack of connective works between these two areas. The first set of works 
examines the role that the US played in Chile from the 1960s to 1973 and is the focus of 
many scholarly works that lay out the purpose and nature of the US’ involvement. The 
focal point of many of these works is the overthrow and death of President Salvador 
Allende on September 11, 1973 by a military coup. In an effort to understand how the 
military coup successfully overthrew President Allende, previous works traced the US’ 
involvement in inciting unrest in Chile in the hopes of encouraging a military coup. The 
first set of works that examine the death of General Schneider situate his death within the 
broader framework of US intervention in Chile during the 1970s. The Pinochet File by 
                                                          
6 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, 7. 
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Peter Kornbluh uses a variety of documents from the Nixon White House, CIA, and State 
Department obtained by the National Security Archive to give a comprehensive overview 
of US covert involvement in Chile during the second half of the 20th century.7 The 
Pinochet File has the most extensive discussion of the US involvement in the plot to 
kidnap General Schneider, yet only briefly mentions his inclusion in the Church 
Committee’s report. Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War by Tanya Harmer 
includes the death of General Schneider within a larger discussion of the US’ role in Latin 
America during the height of the Cold War.8 His death serves as an example of how the 
US used Chile as a battleground in its Cold War fight against communism. These works 
view the botched kidnapping and subsequent assassination of General René Schneider as 
the event that serves as the first concrete example of covert intervention by the US into 
Chilean politics.9 
Driven by the fear that socialist president Salvador Allende would facilitate a 
communist intrusion into the US' traditional sphere of influence in Latin America, the US 
administration felt forced to take action in Chile to stop the electoral ratification of 
presidential victory. To ensure the downfall of Allende, they planned to kidnap General 
Schneider and blame his disappearance on left-wing radicals. In the examination of the role 
of US covert involvement in Chile, the death of General Schneider is included as an early 
example of the role that the US’ covert involvement played in shaping Chile between 1970 
and 1973. Overall there is sparse information about his death in scholarly works, with only 
                                                          
7 Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: New 
Press, 2013). 
8 Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2011). 
9 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 22. 
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these two works providing details about his death beyond the quick summary found in 
other works on US covert involvement in Chile. This set of works categorizes the US’ 
covert involvement in Chilean affairs as an example of the neo-imperialism of the US 
throughout Chile and Latin America in the twentieth century, without looking at the long-
term effects of his death outside of Chile. 
The second set of works that examine the death of General Schneider are those that 
detail the 1975 Church Committee’s investigation of the CIA’s covert involvement in 
foreign countries. Both written by staff members of the Church Committee, A Season of 
Inquiry Revisited by Loch K. Johnson and Democracy in the Dark by Frederick A.O. 
Schwarz address the death of General Schneider in their discussion of Alleged 
Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.10 US National Security, Intelligence, and 
Democracy, edited by Russell A. Miller, includes chapters from a historian, political 
scientist, and members of the Church Committee’s staff.11 Congress Oversees the 
Intelligence Community, by political scientist Frank Smist, covers the history of 
congressional oversight of the intelligence agencies from 1947 to 1990.12 In the chapter 
“Investigative and Institutional Oversight Combined: The Church Senate Committee,” he 
discusses the Church Committee’s impact on strengthening congressional oversight of the 
CIA and White House with only a brief mention of General Schneider.  
                                                          
10 Loch K. Johnson was special assistant to Senator Church, and Frederick A.O. Schwarz was the Church 
Committee’s Chief Counsel; Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry Revisited: The Church Committee 
Confronts America’s Spy Agencies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015); Frederick A.O. Schwarz, 
Democracy in the Dark: The Seduction of Government Secrecy (New York, New York: The New Press, 
2015). 
11 Russell A. Miller, ed., US National Security, Intelligence, and Democracy: From the Church Committee to 
the War on Terror (London: Routledge, 2008). 
12 Frank John Smist, Congress Oversees the Intelligence Community, 1947-1994 (Knoxville: The University 
of Tennessee Press, 1994). 
6 
 
These works only include the death of General Schneider within their discussion of 
Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. Although his death took place in 
Chile, these works examine its continued relevance in the US. These works discuss the 
death of General Schneider because the Church Committee chose to investigate his death 
and the kidnapping plot that led up to his assassination. The Church Committee included 
his death in its wider investigation because documents supplied by the White House and 
interviews given by CIA employees before the Committee included indications that CIA 
officials and officials in the Nixon White House spoke, and perhaps even provided 
supplies, to the Chileans who plotted to kidnap General Schneider.13  
The Church Committee included his death in its investigation and report because 
the plot to kidnap General Schneider that led to his assassination aligned with other 
instances of assassination plots involving foreign leaders. These works view his death as 
just one of a multitude of examples of the US’ covert involvement in kidnapping and 
assassination plots around the world. In its assessment of the attempted kidnapping and 
assassination of General Schneider, his death serves as a building block in the Church 
Committee’s case that congressional oversight of intelligence activities was necessary to 
curb the abuses of the intelligence agencies and White House. By looking at General 
Schneider’s death from the perspective of the Church Committee’s investigation these 
works seek to understand the role that the plot to kidnap him, along with plots involving 
four other foreign leaders, played in accounting for and subsequently curtailing the actions 
of the intelligence agencies and White House. It is important to note that participants in the 
Church Committee wrote all the works except for Congress Oversees the Intelligence 
                                                          
13 Johnson, Season of Inquiry, 47. 
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Community, which was written by a political scientist. No major scholarly works on the 
Church Committee have been written by a historian.  
As detailed above, the examination of General Schneider’s death takes two 
different roles in the existing literature. In both cases, his death serves as an example to 
illustrate a larger phenomenon occurring in two very different locations. In the first 
instance, his death serves as the first concrete example of US covert involvement in Chile. 
Over the next three years, US covert involvement in encouraging a military coup continued 
to grow, culminating with the overthrow of Salvador Allende in 1973. In the second 
instance, his death is one of five examples of alleged US covert involvement in kidnapping 
and assassination plots around the world. As a result of the Church Committee’s 
investigations into these plots, Congress and the White House instituted new laws and 
oversight mechanisms to make sure that the CIA and the White House would never engage 
in plots to assassinate foreign leaders again. 
How General Schneider went from being the victim of a kidnapping plot turned 
assassination to a fundamental piece of the Church Committee’s investigation has 
previously been told in two separate narratives. Instead of simply looking at each of these 
narratives separately, I am seeking to connect and use them to inform each other and gain 
insights into the US’ approach to intelligence activities both in 1970 and 1975. There is 
already a large body of work from historians looking at US covert involvement in Chile 
and from political scientists and first-hand observers looking at the Church Committee 
investigation into assassination plots involving foreign leaders. What is missing is a 
comprehensive historical overview of the ways in which US covert involvement in Chile 
directly affected the creation and investigation of the Church Committee. The death of 
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General Schneider had continued implications for the US even when the Nixon White 
House thought it was a skeleton that would remain in the White House’s closet. The 
declassification and release of additional White House documents since the 1990s 
revealed, for the first time, the White House’s perspective on the Church Committee. 
Unexplored in previous works, I will use these White House documents to show the Ford 
White House’s reaction to the Church Committee investigation as it occurred. By looking 
at the Committee’s investigation from the perspective of both the legislative and executive 
branches, I will show how General Schneider’s death had continued implications for both 
groups. 
Just as it is too narrow a scope to only view the impact of General Schneider’s 
death within the context of US efforts to stop Allende’s election and ratification, it is also 
too narrow to view the story of the Church Committee investigations as starting in 1975 
when the Committee’s members began to investigate possible US covert involvement in 
assassination plots involving foreign leaders. Using the death of General Schneider as an 
example of a potential assassination plot involving a foreign leader conducted by the US 
required the Committee to investigate his death with the goal of finding out whether there 
was US covert involvement in the kidnapping plot that led to his assassination. The 
Committee recognized the context of the Cold War, but a narrow time frame and 
obstruction by the Ford White House did not allow them to consider the full narrative of 
his death. The American public and Congress demanded changes, and the Committee’s 
goal was to uncover and rectify the abuse of the intelligence agencies by the White House 
and increase congressional oversight of the intelligence agencies. The assassination plots 
involving foreign leaders were a key element that generated public outrage. That an 
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example of US involvement in a kidnapping plot turned assassination took place in Chile, a 
country with a history of stable democracy, only made US intervention more shocking.14 
His death was not simply the result of an attempted kidnapping plot orchestrated by the US 
that occurred in 1970. Informed by the US’ policy towards Chile, and indeed Latin 
America, it occurred at a time when Cold War concerns trumped the rules of covert 
involvement in another country’s affairs. Instead of being immediately pinned to the US in 
1970, the death of General Schneider remained a skeleton in the Nixon White House’s 
closet until 1975. 
As a building block of the Church Committee’s report on assassination plots 
involving foreign leaders, the death of General Schneider played a role in the consequences 
that the Committee’s report had for the CIA and the White House. After decades of 
minimal congressional oversight, the Church Committee introduced oversight mechanisms 
to control the intelligence agencies and correct the presidential abuse of power that it saw 
throughout its investigation. The Church Committee’s investigation and report made 
President Ford acknowledge the White House’s past wrongdoings and compelled him to 
prohibit any future misuse of intelligence activities by the White House. Executive Order 
11905 banned the US from carrying out assassinations on foreign soil for the first time in 
US history.15 Additionally, the creation of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees 
strengthened congressional oversight of the intelligence agencies. The actions of the 
Church Committee and its investigation of assassination plots involving foreign leaders 
                                                          
14 Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 31. 
15 Gerald R. Ford: "Executive Order 11905—United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," February 18, 
1976. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59348. 
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demonstrate one way that a moment of national concern over governmental abuse of 
power, stemming from the Watergate scandal, manifested and led to real change.  
Ultimately, it does not matter that the Church Committee found no solid evidence 
that President Nixon and White House officials knew or approved of the final plot to 
kidnap General Schneider that led to his assassination. Although there is evidence that 
President Nixon wished to encourage a military coup in Chile through the kidnapping of 
General Schneider, the Committee found no evidence that President Nixon, or any of his 
staff, explicitly permitted the plotters to carry out an assassination if General Schneider 
resisted. When news of General Schneider’s death reached the US, internal White House 
documents show that the US had no prior knowledge of the his assassins’ actions or 
intentions.16 The evidence uncovered by the Church Committee did not allow them to 
make a definitive claim that the US was either involved or not involved in General 
Schneider’s assassination. It only confirmed that there was US involvement in the planning 
stages of the plot to kidnap him. The true extent of the US’ involvement may never be 
revealed. 
 What is significant about General Schneider’s death is that in the US, the Church 
Committee examined it and saw it as a clear example of illicit US covert involvement in 
the affairs of a foreign country. The fact that the committee chose to include it in the 
Church Committee’s report shows the extraordinary nature of an investigation into the US’ 
most secretive intelligence activities in foreign countries. After years of the White House 
denying its involvement in covert intelligence activities in foreign countries, the Church 
Committee decided to investigate alleged assassination plots and concluded that the White 
                                                          
16 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXI, CHILE, 1969–1973, eds. James 
McElveen and James Siekmeier, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014), Document 169. 
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House plotted to kidnap or assassinate foreign leaders while having no authority to do so. 
The death of General Schneider occurred because the US made an overt attempt to initiate 
a coup to intervene in the ratification of a democratically elected president’s electoral 
victory. The Church Committee’s willingness to include General Schneider’s death in its 
investigation shows that 1975 marked an extraordinary moment of concerted effort to 
bring an end to the White House using the CIA as a tool to carry out covert operations in 
foreign countries and, in the case of General Schneider, to bring about the President’s 
desired outcome of a military coup regardless of its legality. 
As the Church Committee conducted its investigation, the Ford White House knew 
that the investigation threatened to reveal some of the presidency’s most damning secrets. 
One such secret was US covert involvement in Chile, a topic that threatened many in the 
Ford White House who served in the Nixon White House, such as Henry Kissinger, when 
this involvement took place. The same documents showing Henry Kissinger’s involvement 
in planning US covert activities in Chile would later be evidence in the Church 
Committee’s investigation. The Ford White House pushed back against the Committee 
including Chile and the death of General Schneider in its investigation, because it was 
afraid of what it revealed about how recently the US participated in covert activities 
abroad. The days of the imperial presidency ended in the wake of Nixon’s presidency, and 
the White House now realized that the days of unbridled executive power were over. The 
continued implications of General Schneider’s death for the White House threatened to 
reveal, to the Church Committee and the US public, the true extent of the Nixon White 
House’s foreign covert involvement. 
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General Schneider’s death was not the only example of an alleged plot involving a 
foreign leader used in the Church Committee’s report. However, his death does stand out 
in that it connects two different, and important, threads of congressional inquiry during the 
“season of inquiry” of the 1970s.17 The uncovering of US covert involvement in both Chile 
and assassination plots involving foreign leaders is tied together by the death of General 
Schneider. By following these two threads separately at first, and then tying them together 
with the death of General Schneider, I will explore more deeply the role that the 
investigation of the death of General Schneider played in propelling the Committee 
towards uncovering the truth about covert involvement in Chile and assassination plots 
involving foreign leaders. While the season of inquiry the investigation occurred in 
enabled it, the lengths that the Church Committee went to in order to investigate the death 
of General Schneider demonstrates the determination of the Committee to uncover the 
whole truth about US involvement in kidnapping and assassination plots, no matter how 
shocking the truth of US involvement was.  
I argue that following the death of General Schneider from a secret CIA plot gone 
wrong to a matter of congressional inquiry shows the long, convoluted process of 
uncovering and correcting the White House’s use of the CIA to conduct President Nixon’s 
desired covert foreign involvement. The larger story of General Schneider’s death and US 
covert involvement in Chile shows that the investigation and creation of the Church 
Committee’s report on assassination plots involving foreign leaders was not an isolated 
incident. Other congressional committees’ investigations into US covert involvement in 
Chile preceded and influenced the Church Committee’s investigation and interim report. 
                                                          
17 Johnson, Season of Inquiry, 7. 
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These previous investigations also played a pivotal role in spurring Senator Church to form 
a committee dedicated in part to this and other incidents of abuse perpetrated by the 
intelligence agencies. No investigation occurred in isolation, and in fact each was a vital 
building block that gained evidence and awareness for the Committee members, like 
Senator Church, investigating them. 
I will look at the events leading up to the death of General Schneider in 1970, and 
then examine the continued implications of his death in the US with the Church Committee 
in 1975 in order to investigate the ways that his death was part of a greater moment of 
government accountability in the post-Watergate, Cold War climate that impacted the US 
executive branch, legislative branch, and intelligence agencies. The first chapter will detail 
the Nixon White House’s attitude toward Chile, and how US involvement in covert 
activities in Chile led to the death of General Schneider in 1970. The second chapter will 
pick up in 1973 with investigations by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations into US 
involvement in Chile that lead to the formation of the Church Committee in 1975. The 
third chapter will discuss the process of investigating the Alleged Assassination Plots 
Involving Foreign Leaders, the White House’s attitude toward the investigation, and the 
findings of the interim report. In the conclusion I will address the effects of the Church 
Committee’s investigations into assassination plots involving foreign leaders and the long-
term implications of the Committee’s investigation and report for the White House, 
intelligence agencies, and the congressional oversight of both organizations. 
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Chapter 1: US Covert Involvement and the Death of General Schneider 
Latin America has been a sphere of US influence since the US introduced the 
Monroe Doctrine in 1823.1 Since then the US’ imperial ambitions have played out in 
Central and South America, often to disastrous effects in the region. Chile is one of many 
Latin American countries that were targets of US intervention into their economy, politics, 
and society during the twentieth century. From the Dominican Republic to Chile, the US’ 
influence is seen in the collapse of governments considered to be working against US 
interests. The US then worked to usher in new governments friendlier to the US, regardless 
of their actions towards their own citizens.2 In the 1970s, the US reacted to the political 
success of Marxist presidential candidate Salvador Allende in Chile by instituting 
widespread covert involvement in Chile aimed at stopping him from becoming president 
through military, economic, and political intervention.  
The Cuban Revolution marked a critical change in the US’ policy towards Latin 
America. After Fidel Castro ushered in the first viable communist government in the 
Western hemisphere in 1959, the far-off influence of the Soviet Union grew to become a 
tangible threat ninety miles away from American soil.3 The Soviet Union had its sphere of 
influence stretching from Europe to Asia, but the US did not plan on allowing them to 
encroach on the US’ sphere in Latin America. Communism posed an existential danger to 
democracy that could be mobilized and exploited by the US, and became a central theme 
of US national politics during the Cold War.4 Although the US “lost” Cuba to communism, 
                                                          
1 Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 21-
22. 
2 Greg Grandin, Kissinger’s Shadow: The Long Reach of America’s Most Controversial Statesman (New 
York, New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2015), 146. 
3 Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 21. 
4 Joseph Masco, The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect From the Cold War to the War On 
Terror (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 6. 
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the US would be sure not to allow any other Latin American country to follow the same 
path.5 After the Cuban Revolution, the US began zealously guarding the western 
hemisphere from potential Marxist intrusions into the governments of Latin America. 
Chile was historically a bastion of democracy in Latin America, and the US feared that if 
Chile “fell” to communism, the rest of Latin America would follow.6 The Cold War 
continued to escalate during Nixon’s presidency, which began in 1969, and he feared that a 
socialist Chile would create a “red sandwich” in Latin America.7 With Cuba to the north 
and Chile to the south, the democratic nations in the interior of Central and South America 
would be crushed beneath two slices of Soviet influence. 
In the 1970s, Cold War tensions were still running high in Latin America and the 
rest of the world, and the US wanted to preserve its influence in Chile from the threat of 
communist intrusion. Cold War tensions put traditional US claims of promoting peace, 
liberty, and democracy in its foreign affairs up against the more pressing issues of a feared 
world-wide communist takeover. US actions abroad, and particularly in Latin America, no 
longer reflected the US’ claims of promoting peace, liberty, and democracy. Instead, the 
US’ actions transformed into a concerted effort to stop the electoral ratification of the 
democratically elected president of Chile, Salvador Allende, through covert activities. In 
its attempt to stop Allende from assuming office, the CIA used a multitude of covert 
activities: economic, political, and psychological manipulation. These activities eventually 
culminated in October 1970 with an overt attempt to intervene in the Chilean democratic 
                                                          
5 Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism 
(New York: Owl Books: Henry Holt, 2007), 58. 
6 From United States Embassy. Chile to United States. Department of State, “Frei: Transacting the Future,” 
cable, 22 September 1970, Chile and the United States, Digital National Security Archive accession number 
CL00178; hereafter DNSA. 
7 Smith, Last Years, 132. 
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system with the attempted kidnapping of General René Schneider. The US’ involvement in 
the plot that ended with the assassination of General Schneider demonstrates the abuse of 
the intelligence agencies by the Nixon White House during the Cold War that subverted 
the US’ promotion of democracy around the world. 
   
The Election of 1970 and Escalation of US Involvement 
For over a decade, the US watched with increasing wariness the rise of Chilean 
politician Salvador Allende. Even before the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Allende caught 
the attention of the US when he lost the 1958 presidential election by a small margin.8 As a 
leader of the Chilean socialist coalition, his near-upset of right-wing candidate Jorge 
Alessandri concerned President John F. Kennedy in the wake of Fidel Castro’s revolution. 
This marked the beginning of concerted US efforts to stop “leftist revolutionary 
movements” led by Allende. The Alliance for Progress showered Chile with $1.2 billion in 
economic aid and encouraged US investors to increase their investments in Chile.9 The 
Alliance for Progress was only the public half of what the US provided to Chile in aid. The 
US government, covertly working through the CIA, also supported the Christian 
Democratic party and its reformist and centrist policies. Beyond supporting the party 
financially, the CIA also initiated a massive campaign of “press, radio, films, pamphlets, 
posters, leaflets, direct mailings, paper streamers, and wall paintings” attacking Cuban 
communism and encouraging support of the Christian Democratic party.10 Twelve years 
before the pivotal election year of 1970, the US had already demonstrated a willingness to 
                                                          
8 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 3. 
9 Ibid., 5. 
10 Ibid., 4. 
17 
 
interrupt Chile’s democratic process. Although the Cuban Revolution played a key role in 
heightening US fears of communism in Latin America, the election of 1958 shows that 
there were preexisting concerns about the potential for Allende’s electoral success before 
1959. 
The US’ success in supporting candidates through financial contributions and 
propaganda did not last for another election. For a time, the US’ actions to bolster centrist 
candidates appeared to work and in both the 1958 and 1964 elections Allende lost. 
However, in the lead-up to the 1970 Chilean presidential election the strength of US-
backed candidates began to wane. Allende’s coalition of left-wing parties, Unidad Popular 
(UP), faced off against the Christian Democratic Party’s candidate Radomiro Tomic and 
former president Jorge Alessandri. The Chilean presidential race of 1970 threatened to 
fulfill the US’ longstanding fears of Marxist ideology invading Latin America. Socialist 
candidate Salvador Allende’s rising popularity and unprecedented success in the polls in 
the months before the election forced the US to consider the possibility of his election. 
From the Kennedy administration on, the US quietly helped the Christian Democratic party 
in the hopes that it would appeal to the middle-class base the US believed was necessary to 
prevent a leftist candidate’s election. Yet the election of 1970 showed that Allende’s leftist 
politics could also attract the Chilean middle class. Now, quiet economic aid to the 
Christian Democratic Party would not be sufficient to stop Allende and the Unidad 
Popular coalition. The US increased its covert activities to combat the appeal of Allende 
and his socialist policies. 
President Nixon faced the dilemma of how to approach the rising popularity of 
success of Allende as a candidate in the 1970 election. Previous presidential 
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administrations dedicated millions in dollars and the efforts of the CIA to prevent 
Allende’s election, but President Nixon now faced the possibility that Allende would be 
elected against the US’ best efforts. To President Nixon, a man without any faith in the 
ability of “poor, undeveloped countries to govern themselves democratically,” the de-
escalation of US involvement in Chile was not an option.11 President Nixon’s contempt of 
Allende extended to a personal level; to Edward Korry, US ambassador to Chile, he once 
said that the cause of trouble in Chile was “that son of a bitch Allende. We’re going to 
smash him.”12 National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger shared President Nixon’s 
concerns about the threat posed by Allende and general disdain for Chile, remarking that 
he did not see “why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the 
irresponsibility of its people.”13 With no faith in the Chilean people and the belief that 
Allende would bring another Cuban communist dictatorship to Chile, the threat of a 
Marxist president in Chile left President Nixon with no choice. He chose to escalate US 
involvement in the election, and the Allende campaign became the target of increased 
propaganda, financial aid, and covert activities. President Nixon, not the Director of the 
CIA, decreed that Allende would be stopped through covert involvement. An indicator of 
how far he was willing to go in the fight against communism, President Nixon and other 
White House officials took direct action in dictating the course of covert involvement in 
Chile. 
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The attitude of the Nixon White House in the months leading up to the 1970 
Chilean presidential election was one of relentless hostility towards Salvador Allende. 
Funneled through International Telephone & Telegraph (ITT) accounts in Chile, US 
dollars continued to support the other presidential candidates, Radomiro Tomic and Jorge 
Alessandri.14 For months during the presidential campaign the US sent millions of dollars, 
personally authorized by President Nixon, to fund propaganda campaigns across Chile to 
fight back against Allende’s rising poll numbers.15 The CIA hoped that using the same 
propaganda tactics that stopped Allende’s previous attempts to win the presidency would 
work again.16 To aid in spreading its anti-Allende message, the CIA enlisted conservative 
and widely-read Chilean newspaper El Mercurio to run editorials advocating against 
Allende’s election.17 Even with funding of millions of dollars, the polls continued to show 
Salvador Allende on top as election day grew nearer. 
On September 4, 1970, the Chilean people chose Salvador Allende as their next 
president. To the US, an “avowed Marxist” was now president-elect of Chile.18 To Allende 
and his supporters, a “socialist parliamentarian” overcame international opposition to 
become president-elect.19 Yet this was not an immediate victory; Allende obtained the 
plurality of the votes with 36.4 percent of the vote but not an absolute majority.20 It was 
rare for a single candidate to receive over fifty percent of the vote with three major 
candidates running for president. The winning presidential candidate receiving a plurality, 
and not a majority, of the vote was normal in Chile. In the 1964 election, Allende faced 
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Eduardo Frei, who was a coalition candidate. With Allende and Frei as the front-runners in 
the election, the Chilean vote split between the two candidates. In the 1970 election, 
Allende was now a coalition candidate, while the center and right failed to form a coalition 
and put forth a single candidate.21 Instead of two candidates splitting the vote, as in the 
1964 election, three candidates now divided the vote. The other two candidates split the 
center and right-wing vote, while a coalition of left-wing parties backed Allende. With 
three candidates in the 1970 election and as a coalition candidate, Allende was able to 
obtain the plurality of the vote.  
Under Chilean law, Allende’s election results had to be ratified in Congress before 
he could be sworn in as president. After Allende’s election on September 4, 1970, his 
election was set to be ratified in Congress on October 24, 1970. In the intervening period 
between his election and congressional ratification, the US saw its chance to stop 
Allende’s presidency.22 Due to the White House’s knowledge of international and 
domestic attention on Chile, it decided that covert activities to be undertaken before his 
ratification by Congress was the only way to assure that Allende would not become 
president. 
Although Salvador Allende’s politics were decidedly on the left, the reforms he 
advocated for could not simply be labeled as communism as the US called them. Although 
a vocal critic of capitalism and friend to Fidel Castro, he had no close ties to the Soviet 
Union and was “not an invention of Moscow.”23 Salvador Allende’s particular form of 
socialism gained popularity in Chile due to his idea of “La Vía Chilena” or “The Chilean 
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Way” to socialism. Instead of a swift transition to economic socialist policies, Allende 
promised that Chile would go through the democratic process and each socialist policy he 
hoped to enact would be put up to a vote in Congress. His base of support primarily 
consisted of workers and middle class university students, and his Unidad Popular 
coalition united radicals, communists, socialists, and traditional left-wing supporters. He 
promised a revolution “of red wine and empanadas,” and the Chilean people responded 
with their support in the 1970 election.24 
Allende’s Chilean-focused policies also urged “liberation” from economic 
dependency on the US, especially in the copper industry.25 The US’ economic interest was 
firmly rooted in Chile’s economy, especially the copper industry, throughout the twentieth 
century. Copper was a major Chilean export and the copper mining industry was a key 
component of Chile’s economy. Two American mining companies, Anaconda and 
Kennecott, heavily invested in Chilean copper mines and had holdings of hundreds of 
millions of dollars in Chile.26 Outside of the copper mining industry, ITT was the third 
largest investor in Chile, with holdings ranging from the Chilean Telephone Company 
(CTC) to hotels and communications.27 Committed to supporting these American interests 
in Chile, the US government promoted US investment there by working with the Chilean 
government to create favorable conditions for US companies. One of Allende’s campaign 
promises was to nationalize the Chilean copper industry; an important issue to many 
Chileans. Even US-supported candidate Eduardo Frei advocated for the partial 
                                                          
24 Thomas C. Wright, Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 
129. 
25 Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 34. 
26 “ITT in Chile,” NACLA, accessed December 16, 2017, https://nacla.org/article/itt-chile. 
27 Ibid. 
22 
 
nationalization of copper mines.28 Allende’s socialist campaign promises put him squarely 
against US businesses heavily invested in the Chilean copper industry and Chileans who 
profited from US business ventures in Chile.29 The economic threat to US companies of 
Chilean nationalization of US-owned mining companies fed into the growing US 
government and corporate discontent with his ideology and policies. As a charismatic 
leader with the popular masses behind him, his warm relationship with Fidel Castro, and 
his avowed socialist ideology, Salvador Allende was exactly the type of leader the US was 
afraid of as it fought the Cold War in Europe, Asia, and Latin America.30 
As news of his election arrived in the White House, officials contacted the CIA to 
inform them that covert activities would be taking place in Chile to impede Allende’s 
assumption of the presidency. The US “suffered a most grievous defeat,” and needed to act 
quickly to stop Allende before he gained any more power.31 The State Department, CIA, 
and White House devised two plans for covert involvement to stop Allende’s inauguration. 
The first plan, known as Track I, was to pay Chilean congress members to vote against the 
ratification of Allende’s election. The second plan, known as Track II, was to foment a 
coup to stop the congressional ratification of Allende’s electoral victory so he could not 
take or hold office.32 Although action on both tracks ran simultaneously, President Nixon 
and his closest advisors focused on the implementation of Track II. They feared that the 
bribed Chilean Congress members of Track I would not follow through on their promise to 
vote against ratifying Allende’s victory. Although Track II would not be a coup in the 
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strictest sense of the word, since Allende would not have yet held governmental power 
before his presidential inauguration, this plan would be conducted with the intention of 
stopping him from assuming governmental power. Additionally, coup is the nomenclature 
used in White House documents to talk about impeding the ratification of Allende’s 
electoral victory. President Nixon’s orders on September 15th to CIA director Richard 
Helms to “prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him” kicked off nearly two 
months of Track II activity that escalated US covert involvement in Chile.33 
Following Allende’s election, the pressure mounted within the White House to find 
a way to prevent the ratification of Allende’s electoral victory. Two of President Nixon’s 
closest advisors, Secretary of State William Rogers and National Security Advisor Henry 
Kissinger, discussed how “if the first time a Communist wins the US tries to prevent the 
constitutional process from coming into play we will look very bad.”34 Kissinger 
responded that “the President’s view is to do the maximum possible to prevent an Aliente 
[sic] takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low posture.”35 The Nixon White 
House was already aware that any US involvement in stopping Allende’s ratification 
would have to be discreet and limited to aiding anti-Allende Chileans. It was also aware of 
the international attention on the presidential race, as Allende would be the first 
democratically-elected socialist president in the Western Hemisphere. The election of 
Allende forced the US to face the political, economic, and ideological fears that Allende 
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generated. On the most basic level he was a political threat that, the US feared, would turn 
Chile from democracy to socialism. The US also faced economic pressure from US 
companies in Chile, who recognized that Allende’s election meant the nationalization of 
the industries US companies controlled. Finally, the ideological threat posed by Allende 
made the Nixon White House see his every action through the lens of the Cold War. As the 
reality of Allende’s election grew threateningly closer, President Nixon’s White House 
advisors faced the possibility that financial efforts and the spread of propaganda would not 
be enough to stop an Allende victory. Yet even if elected, there would still be a narrow 
window of opportunity to stop Allende’s inauguration as president.  
The delicate balance between its differing public and private attitudes towards 
Allende forced the US to design and coordinate the coup to stop Allende’s electoral 
ratification without taking direct action in any coup activities. Internally, the White House 
stressed that “the US cannot operate this plan: it must be Chilean and Frei's. Our support 
and stimulus may be crucial, and resources may become important. But in essence we 
would be backstopping a Chilean effort.”36 This cable signals the White House’s concern 
that its involvement in the plot remain on a strictly material and strategic level. It had no 
desire to get agents on the ground in Chile involved with any plot beyond playing a 
supportive role in it. Any coup attempt would have to come from inside the Chilean 
government, and current president Eduardo Frei was singled out to propel these efforts. 
Yet Frei was unwilling to take an active stance against the ratification of Allende’s 
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election. He was concerned about protecting his own popularity, decided by the same 
public that chose Allende as their next president.37 
Voicing little hope that Frei could spur a coup, Ambassador Korry provided the 
White House with his prognosis on other Chileans’ ability to attempt a coup. If Frei would 
not risk his popularity to oppose Allende, Korry identified Chilean military generals as 
potential leaders of a coup.38 It would be up to Chilean military officials to carry out the 
actual coup activities, but their actions would be planned and funded by the White House 
acting through CIA officials stationed in Santiago. On October 10, a CIA official stationed 
in Santiago received a cable from CIA headquarters offering guidance on coup plotting 
that reaffirmed the US’ “firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a 
coup… It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so 
that USG [United States Government] and American hand be well hidden.”39 The cable 
lays out the importance to the CIA and White House of keeping US covert involvement a 
secret from both the Chilean and American public. Although concerned about keeping 
these activities covert, the US was still willing to go to great lengths to ensure that Allende 
was not inaugurated. While privately plotting to overthrow the democratically elected 
president of another nation-state, publicly the US planned to give no sign of its true 
attitude towards Chile. 
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Creating an Atmosphere of Intervention 
The White House shifted its focus to members of the Chilean military who could 
impede the ratification of Allende’s election in Congress. The first military official it 
considered as a possible ally in stopping Allende’s electoral ratification in the legislature 
was General René Schneider, the commander-in-chief of the army and a staunch 
constitutionalist. What CIA officers stationed in Chile soon learned was that General 
Schneider would not rescind his support of Allende’s valid and legal electoral results. In 
fact, US officials in the CIA and White House soon learned that General Schneider created 
what Ambassador Korry dubbed the “Schneider Doctrine of Nonintervention.”40 General 
Schneider firmly believed that the military should not have a political role in the Chilean 
government. The military ought to be an apolitical organization that answered only to the 
Chilean constitution, and not to political parties and government officials.41 Instead of 
being a potential ally of the US who could help inspire a coup to stop the congressional 
ratification of Allende’s victory, General Schneider was now the “stumbling block” to 
making a coup attempt into a reality.42 
With the knowledge that General Schneider would resist any attempts to stop 
Allende’s presidency, the Nixon White House changed its focus on him from one of the 
potential coup leaders to the target of a plot to inspire a coup. If a coup were to take place, 
General Schneider would have to be neutralized first.43 White House officials, the US 
military attaché in Chile, State Department officials, and CIA officers planned how 
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General Schneider and his command of the armed forces could be neutralized.44 Under the 
direction of other Chilean military officials, General Schneider would be kidnapped and 
taken to Argentina. Yet it remains unclear what would happen to General Schneider when 
he arrived in Argentina. The White House makes no mentions or inquiries into this stage of 
the plot, only concerning themselves with how events would transpire in Chile after 
General Schneider’s removal. Even the language to describe what would happen to 
General Schneider was not consistent; various plotters in contact with the White House 
referred to its actions as kidnapping, abducting, neutralizing, and removing him. It remains 
unclear what the White House or the Chilean plotters planned to do with General 
Schneider once he was in Argentina. Later events showed that the plotters did not plan on 
what they would do in the event that he was mortally wounded during the kidnapping 
attempt. 
The US’ focus was on the events in Chile that it hoped the removal of General 
Schneider would trigger. With General Schneider out of the picture, a coup climate could 
be created and the military would play a key, and decidedly political, role. A high-ranking 
military official who was anti-Allende and sympathetic to a coup would be named as the 
new commander-in-chief of the army.45 News of General Schneider’s kidnapping would 
soon reach the Chilean public and the army would be under the authority of a new anti-
Allende commander-in-chief.46 The military’s blame for his kidnapping would fall on left-
wing radical supporters of Salvador Allende, leading to a national uprising to demand that 
Congress not ratify Allende’s election results.47 The outrage amongst the Chilean public at 
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the kidnapping would create the coup climate that the US and anti-Allende Chilean 
military officials desired. This plot reveals another oversight by the US in its plot to stop 
Allende’s ratification. The US planned on blaming a group of Allende’s leftist supporters 
for the kidnapping, yet there was no reason why they would do this. General Schneider in 
no way threatened Allende supporters or leftists, and they would have no reason to kidnap 
him. His unwillingness to allow the military to intervene in Allende’s election would be 
good for leftists, and not a reason to remove him from Chile. The only group that stood to 
lose from his unwillingness to allow military intervention in politics were right-wing 
supporters who wanted to stop Allende from assuming office. There was no guarantee that 
the plot would work, and in fact it would have taken an extraordinary amount of luck on 
the plotters’ side to successfully kidnap General Schneider, remove him to Argentina, and 
stop Allende’s electoral ratification. Although it is not clear whether the US actually 
thought that Chileans would not question placing the blame on leftists or it was unaware 
that this made no sense, it raises questions about how well the US thought out the plot to 
kidnap General Schneider. 
 The Nixon White House now faced a new problem in its efforts to impede 
Allende’s presidency; it needed to find the appropriate military official to plan and conduct 
the kidnapping plot with the guidance of the US. This forced the US, acting through CIA 
agents on the ground in Santiago, to look for a right-leaning general willing to kidnap 
General Schneider and lead the ensuing coup. Any military official considered to carry out 
the kidnapping plot would have to be an opponent of the Schneider Doctrine, and it did not 
take long to find possible plotters amongst the Chilean military. The two Chilean military 
officials in contact with the US to conduct the kidnapping were General Roberto Viaux 
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and General Camilo Valenzuela. Both generals opposed the Schneider Doctrine and 
viewed the military as a reactionary force which should be engaged in Chilean politics.48 
First, the CIA officers in Chile communicated extensively with General Viaux, who 
planned to kidnap General Schneider and blame it on Allende supporters to stop the 
congressional ratification of Allende. The US shared his opposition to General Schneider 
but believed that General Viaux should not work alone, so the CIA sent a cable to 
“continue to encourage him to amplify his planning; (C) encourage him to join forces with 
other coup planners so that they may act in concert either before or after 24 October. (N.B. 
six gas masks and six CS canisters are being carried to Santiago by special courier.)”49 
Sent six days before the botched kidnapping and assassination of General Schneider, and 
one day after Kissinger claimed to cut off US contact with the plotters, this cable sheds 
light on the exact nature of the material support provided by the US to the plotters. 
Although not willing to be directly responsible for the kidnapping plot, this fear of 
discovery did not stop the US from providing armaments and strategic leadership guidance 
to the plotters through CIA officers in Santiago.  
The US was also willing to revoke support of any plotter who it believed might fail. 
This led the CIA to turn off active coup plotting with General Viaux due to doubt 
surrounding his ability to lead a coup. On October 15th administration officials, including 
Henry Kissinger, decided to warn General Viaux not to attempt the kidnapping plot and to 
wait for further instructions. The CIA now shifted its attentions to General Valenzuela, the 
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second potential coup plotter, and provided him with machine guns to aid in the 
kidnapping of General Schneider.50 Yet General Valenzuela never got to use the machine 
guns handed over by a CIA officer, nor did he have the chance to kidnap General 
Schneider and carry out the coup plot.51 
The CIA had not followed Kissinger’s order to defuse Viaux’s plot on October 
15th. Documents show that CIA officers continued to meet with Chilean military officials 
at least once after Kissinger ordered the CIA to terminate direct US involvement with the 
plotters under the leadership of General Viaux. A cable sent to CIA headquarters on 
October 18th reports a CIA officer “met clandestinely evening 17 Oct. with two Chilean 
Armed Forces officers who told him their plans were moving along better than possibly 
expected. They asked that by evening 18 Oct. co-optee arrange furnish them with eight to 
ten tear gas grenades.”52 Five days before the botched kidnapping of General Schneider, 
one group of plotters was asking for more materials and reporting back to the CIA on the 
progress of their plot, demonstrating their continued cooperation with and support by the 
CIA. The Church Committee examined this discrepancy and could not come to a 
conclusion regarding continued CIA interactions with the plotters days after Kissinger 
ordered communication to stop. Even Henry Kissinger, in a private conversation with 
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former Secretary of State William Rogers, was unsure of the exact nature of the continued 
CIA interactions with General Valenzuela. He told former Secretary of State Rogers that 
“if you read it carefully you will see that the group that did it under no theory had anything 
to do with us. By all evidence we turned it off on October 15… the CIA representatives 
staying in touch with the plotting groups and activity might have been more than reporting 
on what was going on.”53 This conversation occurred on November 21, 1975, one day after 
the release of the Church Committee’s interim report. With his extensive involvement in 
US covert activities in Chile, Kissinger needed to present all the evidence that he was not 
involved in the botched kidnapping of General Schneider in the face of the Committee’s 
investigation.  
Though White House officials initially appeared to direct the CIA’s interactions 
with Generals Viaux and Valenzuela, for an unknown amount of time after Kissinger gave 
the order on October 15th to turn off direct contact the CIA continued to interact with the 
plotters and furnish them with military supplies to aid in the kidnapping plot. This raises 
the issue of whether CIA or White House officials were in control of the interactions of US 
intelligence agents with the plotters. Until this point President Nixon or senior White 
House officials, like Henry Kissinger, appeared to be responsible for dictating the course 
of covert activities in Chile. It remains unclear if Kissinger did call off involvement with 
the plotters and the CIA did not follow through with his order, if Kissinger never conveyed 
his order to the CIA, or another scenario entirely. With no clear answer to who called off 
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the kidnapping plot, it is unknown whether the White House or CIA supervised the 
kidnapping plot, adding another wrinkle to the narrative. 
The Nixon White House found two military officials, Generals Viaux and 
Valenzuela, who were willing to conduct the kidnapping plot of General Schneider and 
lead the coup attempt that would hopefully followed. Yet a month after President Nixon 
declared his intent to encourage a coup in Chile, he and Kissinger decided to call it off. It 
soon became clear that the administration’s orders, channeled through the CIA, for the 
generals to stand down and wait for further orders were not followed. Although Kissinger 
later stated that he ordered the CIA to cut off contact with Generals Viaux and Valenzuela, 
the CIA took no such action. Each general had a variety of military armaments from the 
CIA, and they saw no reason why they should wait for US orders to act when the Allende’s 
electoral ratification drew closer by the day.54 CIA officials in Chile continued their 
correspondence with the Generals, and CIA headquarters urged agents in Chile to reassure 
the Generals that “USG [United States Government] support for anti-Allende action 
continues.”55 This is at odds with Kissinger’s later statement that evidence pointed to the 
CIA turning off contact with the plotters on October 15; the CIA either believed or wanted 
the plotters to believe that the US still supported their kidnapping plot. Between October 
19th and 22nd the plotters made three attempts, without direct approval from the CIA or the 
Nixon White House, to kidnap General Schneider. The US was no longer in control of the 
kidnapping plot; Generals Viaux and Valenzuela were both working independently to 
execute the plan the US provided to them. 
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The first two unsuccessful attempts made by Generals Viaux and Valenzuela failed 
due to the inability to get close enough to General Schneider to kidnap him. In the first 
plot, General Schneider would be kidnapped as a he left a military stag (bachelor) party.56 
For his first attempt on October 19th, General Viaux extensively planned what would occur 
during and after the kidnapping plot. The CIA station in Santiago relayed his plans, as 
follows, to CIA headquarters: 
 1. After arriving at the house, Schneider would be abducted. 
 2. He would be taken to a waiting airplane and flown to Argentina. 
 3. Valenzuela would announce that Schneider had “disappeared.” 
 4. The military would blame the kidnapping on leftists and would “institute a 
search for Schneider in all of  Chile, using this search as a pretext to raid 
Communist-controlled poblaciones [neighborhoods].” 
 5. The military command would be shuffled to put coup plotters in positions of 
power. 
 6. Frei would resign and leave Chile. 
 7. A new military Junta would “be installed” headed by Admiral Hugo Tirado. 
 8. The Junta would dissolve Congress.57 
 
As he walked to his official Mercedes, his security forces would withdraw and the 
kidnappers would grab him. Yet General Schneider decided to drive his personal car home, 
and the kidnappers withdrew in nervousness due to this unexpected twist. It is unclear why 
the kidnappers believed an official car would take him to the party, and why they were not 
prepared for if he drove himself. General Viaux prepared a detailed timeline, but he was 
not ready for any surprises when the time came to execute the plot. On October 20th 
General Valenzuela attempted to kidnap General Schneider. He planned to intercept 
General Schneider as he left the Ministry of Defense by car at the end of the work day.58 
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Yet General Schneider left during rush hour, and the downtown Santiago traffic caused the 
car full of kidnappers get stuck in traffic and lose sight of General Schneider’s car. Two 
attempts led by Generals Viaux and Valenzuela to kidnap General Schneider and provoke 
a coup to stop Allende’s ratification in Congress failed, even with the initial support of the 
US and the CIA. 
The third attempt on October 22nd by General Viaux succeeded with the kidnapping 
group getting close enough to General Schneider, but the plot did not go according to 
plan.59 An unknown number of men waited for General Schneider as he drove from his 
home in Santiago to work at military headquarters in downtown Santiago. As General 
Schneider sat in the backseat of his chauffeured car on his way to work at 8:00 a.m., 
General Valenzuela’s group of kidnappers struck.60 Eight blocks from his home, the group 
used a Jeep to hit the car General Schneider traveled in, and blockaded the street with three 
other vehicles.61 With nowhere for General Schneider’s car to go, the kidnappers 
approached it and broke the backseat window where the General sat. To their surprise, 
General Schneider pulled out his own gun to defend himself. With the possibility of 
quickly and quietly kidnapping him now gone, the kidnappers quickly fired at him three 
times, hitting him in the hand and the chest. The group quickly took off in their cars as the 
chauffeur scrambled to find his gun. The chauffeur immediately drove General Schneider 
to the Military Hospital in Santiago. General Schneider initially survived the kidnapping 
turned assassination attempt, but he lay seriously injured in the hospital with wounds in his 
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arms and chest. At 9:00 p.m. that night, President Frei made a public statement on the 
shooting of General Schneider. He expressed his grief and extended condolences to the 
General and his family, and ended his statement by saying that the “attempt is not only an 
attack on the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, if not the same institution and all of the 
armed forces, and it shows the purpose of its perpetrators to alter the democratic life of this 
country.”62 President Frei did not know how accurate this assessment was, nor that the 
perpetrators included generals in the Chilean army backed up with US support. 
Allende’s electoral ratification in Congress on October 24th went on as planned, and 
Congress formally announced him as the winner of the 1970 election as General Schneider 
lay in the hospital critically injured.63 General Schneider lived for three more days, and 
died at the hospital on October 25th from his injuries.64 The only impact of General 
Schneider’s death on Allende’s ratification as president was the cancellation of a victory 
celebration by Allende’s supporters.65 On October 27th Chile buried General Schneider in 
the Army Pantheon, and in the procession from Santiago’s Cathedral to his resting place 
President Frei and President-elect Allende walked side by side, leading the public funeral 
procession.66 The Santiago police launched an investigation into his shooting within hours, 
and set out to find those responsible for the crime. Throughout the five days between the 
ambush on his car and his burial, the investigation continued. The police investigated his 
shooting as a deliberate attempt, and not a random occurrence.  
                                                          
62 “Decretada Zona de Emergencia: Toque de Queda en Santiago (Emergency Zone Decreed: Curfew in 
Santiago),” El Mercurio, (Santiago, Chile), Oct. 23, 1970. 
63 Joseph Novitski, “Allende Backers Cancel Plan for Victory Celebration,” The New York Times, October 
24, 1970; hereafter NYT. 
64 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 12. 
65 Joseph Novitski, “Allende Backers Cancel Plan for Victory Celebration,” NYT, October 24, 1970. 
66 Joseph Novitski, “Chile Buries General as Martyr,” NYT, October 27, 1970. 
36 
 
Therefore, it is misleading to simply call this a shooting that lead to a death. Instead 
it is fitting to say that a group of men assassinated General Schneider when it became 
apparent that a kidnapping would not work because he took out his gun to defend himself. 
Although it is not clear whether the group set out to kill or kidnap General Schneider on 
October 22nd, it is apparent that when they shot him they were motivated by political 
means to remove a prominent figure in the Chilean military. The end goal of the plot was 
to remove General Schneider from Chile, and although the original plan stated that this 
would be by kidnapping him and removing him to Argentina, his death achieved the goal 
of removing his opposition to the non-constitutional plan to remove Allende from office 
via a coup. Not only had the plot to kidnap General Schneider gone awry, but the hope that 
removing him from Chile would encourage a coup to stop Salvador Allende’s 
congressional ratification also proved futile.  
Three days before General Schneider’s death, as he lay mortally wounded in the 
hospital, a State Department official sent a memorandum to Kissinger suggesting that he 
tell President Nixon to send a note of condolences to the Chilean president. The State 
Department official had no way to know the irony of President Nixon sending his 
condolences to President Frei for the grievous injuries the public believed that General 
Schneider received in an assassination attempt by unknown assailants. The State 
Department official dutifully provided the suggested text for the President’s note.67 It read: 
 Dear Mr. President, 
The shocking attempt on the life of General Schneider is a stain on the 
pages of contemporary history. I would like you to know of my sorrow that this 
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repugnant event occurred in your country, and would ask you to extend to General 
Schneider and his family my sympathy and best wishes for a speedy recovery.  
  
Sincerely, 
 Richard Nixon 
 
The Aftermath of General Schneider’s Death 
General Schneider was dead, the Chilean Congress ratified Allende’s electoral 
victory with an overwhelming majority, and newspapers were already pointing to the 
involvement of General Viaux and even the CIA in his death.68 For the next three years of 
Allende’s presidency, the US stopped plotting to target specific individuals in Chile.69 
Instead, it relied on economic and psychological manipulation in Chile to undermine 
Allende’s presidency and encourage another military coup to overthrow him, which finally 
occurred on September 11, 1973 under the leadership of General Agosto Pinochet.70 
The US was forced to balance its fears of a communist takeover in the US with the 
fear of public backlash if news of US covert involvement got out in the press. The seeming 
disconnect between White House foreign policy, run by National Security Advisor Henry 
Kissinger who ordered the CIA to tell the kidnappers to halt its plans, and the CIA officials 
who swore under oath that they never received the orders to halt the operation showed just 
how tenuous US attitudes towards Chile could be. In 1970, only White House officials and 
the Chileans involved in the kidnapping plot knew that the CIA followed White House 
orders and helped foment a coup. A few years later, after the overthrow of Allende, CIA 
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and White House involvement in Chile became public knowledge and spurred a “season of 
inquiry” about US intelligence operations in Chile and around the world.71 
Between 1970 and 1974, little happened to spread knowledge of the story and 
circumstances of General Schneider’s botched kidnapping turned assassination to an 
audience outside of Chile. Although the group of plotters failed to kidnap General 
Schneider and blame it on leftists, the Chilean police quickly uncovered General Viaux’s 
responsibility for planning the kidnapping. Chilean courts convicted him on the charges of 
attempted kidnapping and conspiracy to provoke a coup.72 With the story of General 
Viaux’s failed coup attempt splashed across the front pages of the Chilean newspapers and 
even reaching the New York Times, General Schneider’s death did not serve as the catalyst 
for a coup as the plotters and US government hoped. Instead, the Chilean police succeeded 
in finding, arresting, and prosecuting General Viaux, General Valenzuela, and the other 
men involved in the kidnapping plot. As the true story of what happened on the morning of 
October 25, 1970 came to light, the Chilean newspapers began to speak of CIA covert 
involvement in the coup plot. Yet the mutterings of CIA involvement never became more 
than mere conjecture in the newspapers.  
With General René Schneider dead and Allende inaugurated as president, the 
Nixon White House’s plans transformed into attempts to destabilize Allende’s presidency. 
It used similar covert measures to those employed during the presidential election to 
continue to support anti-Allende factions in Chile and make Allende’s presidency a 
failure.73 Plots to stop Allende’s inauguration transformed into plans to cripple the Chilean 
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economy, initiating another round of covert economic involvement that continued until 
Allende’s overthrow in September 1973.74 Economic intervention, along with military and 
political manipulation, formed the long-term plan by the US to destabilize Chile after the 
failure to initiate a coup in 1970.75 Cold War tensions made the US neglect its claims of 
promoting peace, liberty, and democracy in its foreign affairs. Instead, US involvement in 
Chile turned to covert activities to overthrow Salvador Allende. 
Looking back at the planning and execution of the plot to kidnap General 
Schneider, it failed in every regard for both the Chilean coup plotters and the Nixon White 
House. The expectation that the commander-in-chief of the army, a career army officer, 
would allow himself to be kidnapped without a fight was the first glaring oversight made 
by the US and Chilean plotters. Then, the confusion over whether the CIA ever received 
the order from Kissinger to turn off US support of the coup plotters is another issue in 
determining the course of events leading up to the kidnapping attempt. It is impossible to 
determine whether there was a genuine mistake made in the communication between 
Kissinger and the CIA that caused the message ordering the CIA to cease involvement 
with the coup plotters to never reach the CIA. There is also the more conspiratorial 
possibility that either the CIA or Kissinger was not telling the truth about having received 
or sent the order to cease involvement.  
 These mistakes and oversights had a twofold outcome. On one hand they led to the 
assassination, and not kidnapping, of General Schneider. However, the documentation of 
these mistakes in memorandum, telephone transcripts, and cables from the CIA and the 
White House later served as evidence for the extensive involvement of the Nixon White 
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House in covert activities in Chile, thus setting the stage for the Church Committee’s 
investigation. The evidence of General Schneider’s death, and US activities leading up to 
it, revealed covert economic, political, psychological manipulation by the US and an overt 
attempt to start a coup with the US sponsored plans to kidnap General Schneider. That the 
plan to kidnap General Schneider instead became an assassination also led to its inclusion 
in the Committee’s report on alleged assassination plots involving foreign leaders. The 
greater context that his death occurred in reveals the importance that it plays beyond being 
an assassination. The context of the various, aggressive forms of US covert involvement in 
Chile speaks to the length that the Nixon White House went to in order to achieve its 
mission to stop the perceived socialist threat posed by Allende. These efforts by the Nixon 
White House to stop Allende also provided evidence from the CIA and White House that 
the Church Committee would uncover and use in its investigation. The body of evidence 
created by this plot formed the basis of the Church Committee’s investigation and allowed 
them to uncover the extent of the Nixon White House’s exploitation of the CIA in order to 
take down Allende.  
The evidence from the White House and CIA provides answers for some questions 
about the death of General Schneider while still leaving others unanswered. One goal of 
the Church Committee was to uncover whether President Nixon or the CIA Director 
dictated US covert involvement in Chile. Memorandums and conversations from the White 
House revealed to the Church Committee that President Nixon was heavily involved in 
dictating the course of covert involvement in Chile. These documents also demonstrate the 
complete lack of congressional oversight of the intelligence agencies and the White House. 
However, some questions are still unanswered even after the Church Committee’s 
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investigation. It remains unclear whether there are missing documents about what was 
going to happen to General Schneider after he was kidnapped and flown to Argentina, or 
whether the US was simply not concerned about this stage of the plot. 
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Chapter 2: The Creation of the Church Committee 
 Five years after the events in Chile surrounding the assassination of General 
Schneider in 1970, the Church Committee showed that his death and US involvement in it 
was not a finished story. In 1975, the assassination of General Schneider captured the 
interest of the US government once again with the Church Committee’s investigation. 
When the matter of General Schneider’s death came up again in the Church Committee’s 
1975 investigation, the White House looked very different than it had in 1970. The five 
years that passed saw the presidency undergo one of its greatest crises of the twentieth 
century during the presidency of President Nixon. Between 1971 and 1974 President 
Nixon faced numerous scandals from the publishing of the Pentagon Papers in 1971, the 
Watergate scandal in 1972, and finally the announcement of his resignation in 1974. As the 
Watergate scandal broke in Washington, increased protests against the Vietnam War across 
the country shifted the public opinion of the US’ role abroad. The public began to question 
the Vietnam War’s necessity and costs.1 Disillusioned by the endless fighting of the 
Vietnam War, many Americans began to critically examine the Cold War context that led 
the US into Vietnam. In the aftermath of the Watergate scandal and the continuation of the 
Vietnam War, Congress joined the press and public in actively demanding accountability 
from the Nixon White House. 
 For decades, the Cold War preoccupied the American presidency. Dedicated to 
competing with the Soviet Union, presidents from Eisenhower to Nixon intervened in 
foreign affairs from Vietnam to Chile in order to expand US influence and keep out Soviet 
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influence. In determining these action abroad the White House acted nearly unilaterally, 
utilizing the US intelligence agencies with minimal oversight by Congress. Yet the events 
during Nixon’s presidency that shook US trust in the White House, such as the information 
revealed in the Pentagon Papers and the Watergate investigation, signaled the end of 
unquestioning public acceptance of the president’s choices. As investigations into 
President Nixon’s actions at home and abroad drew Americans to TV screens and 
newspapers, the public began to question the actions of the White House. For years, 
Americans accepted that the decisions made by President Nixon were legal and made in 
the interest of protecting the US. Yet the investigations revealed that President Nixon’s 
“imperial presidency” single-handedly controlled US actions abroad with minimal 
oversight by the legislative or judicial branches.2 
 The resignation of Richard Nixon in 1974 left Vice President Gerald Ford with the 
unenviable job of restoring public trust in the presidency while presiding over the 
investigations that still continued into the abuses of the Nixon presidency. Now President, 
Gerald Ford confronted the monumental task of restoring public trust in the presidency 
while guiding America in the aftermath of the first presidential resignation.3 It was in this 
moment of depleted public trust in the presidency, as President Ford worked to restore that 
trust, which the Church Committee formed. The “Cold War consensus” that the president 
had a right to control the intelligence agencies’ actions at home and abroad began to 
unravel.4 Now, the unveiling of the imperialistic rule of the president over the intelligence 
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agencies led to a questioning of the central principles that governed the US’ past covert 
activities at home and abroad.  
This questioning took many forms; in investigative reporting, depleted public trust 
in the White House, and formal organized investigations in the White House and Congress, 
such as the Church Committee.5 It was not easy to create an effective and accepted 
investigation when faced with competition and communication issues. Amongst other 
foreign and domestic issues, the Church Committee questioned the consequences of past 
presidential administrations’ foreign policy decisions as they related to assassination plots 
involving foreign leaders. While the Church Committee’s investigation into assassination 
plots was unique and unusual, it was not unprecedented.  
The Watergate scandal inaugurated a season of inquiry, and in the following years 
many of the White House’s and intelligence agencies’ most secret activities were subjected 
to public and legislative scrutiny. At many points during the formation and investigation of 
the Church Committee, the Ford White House tried to forestall the Committee and its 
investigation. However, it did not succeed in stopping the Church Committee’s intention to 
investigate US covert involvement in Chile, especially in regards to the death of General 
Schneider. At this point in the narrative, US covert involvement in Chile and US 
involvement in plots to assassinate foreign leaders are two separate threads. However, this 
chapter will lay the groundwork for how the death of General Schneider later brought these 
two threads together. 
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The Origins of the Church Committee 
 The history of congressional oversight of the intelligence agencies shows a large 
gap between the intended oversight function and the reality of oversight. With the 
formation of the CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Security Agency 
(NSA) and other intelligence agencies post-World War II, the Senate and House of 
Representative’s Committee on Armed Services became the appointed oversight body to 
oversee the agencies’ activities.6 However, between the late 1940s and mid-1970s this 
oversight existed in name only. Before the mid-1970s, there was little in the way of 
guidelines for what information regarding intelligence activities the President or agency 
directors had to turn over to the Committee. This left the Committee ignorant, whether 
willfully or not, of the intelligence activities that various agencies conducted. Beyond the 
limited number of congressional members participating in the committees, members of 
Congress were kept unaware of the intelligence agencies’ actions.7 Previous efforts from 
1947 to 1974 to improve congressional oversight of the intelligence agencies resulted in 
approximately 150 proposals. Of these 150 proposals, two made it to the floor of Congress 
and members of Congress declined to pass either of them.8  
Additionally, there was little knowledge of whether the President, the agency 
directors, or some combination thereof initiated and directed intelligence activities. In this 
framework of the committee tasked with overseeing the intelligence agencies in name 
only, it comes as little surprise that these committees never closely investigated US covert 
intervention in Chile until the establishment of the Church Committee. The year of its 
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establishment, 1975, marked a moment of change for Congress. Both houses of Congress 
had a Democratic majority, and in the wake of the Watergate scandal Congress was ready 
to take action against Nixon’s imperial presidency.9 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In order to understand the Church 
Committee and its eventual investigation into the assassination of General Schneider, it is 
first crucial to understand the driving forces for the creation of the Committee and its 
investigation into the intelligence agencies. The first driving force was the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. This Committee’s investigations and hearings into the 
US’ relationship with Chile in the early 1970s introduced CIA involvement in Chile to 
Congress. These occurred in March to September 1973 and August to September 1974. 
First, from March to September 1973, the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on 
Multinational Corporations uncovered the CIA’s covert partnership with ITT in Chile to 
transfer money to fund its covert political and military involvement and propaganda during 
the 1970 presidential election. Then, from August to September 1974, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee Hearings on Détente exposed CIA covert activities in Chile while 
investigating the broader issue of détente with communist countries.  
The second driving force was Senator Frank Church. Serving on both of these 
committees, Senator Frank Church participated in the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations’ uncovering of concrete examples of CIA covert involvement in Chile from the 
late 1960s to the early 1970s. From the investigation and hearings of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations and his own questions posed to the members of the Nixon White 
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House that the Committee interviewed, it became clear to Senator Church that Chile was 
another overlooked area of congressional oversight of CIA activities. The inquiries by the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations uncovered the “tip of the iceberg” that was US 
covert involvement in Chile, and the Committee’s work shaped and served as a building 
block for the Church Committee’s investigation into CIA activities in Chile.10  
 Before the Church Committee began to investigate the intelligence agencies in 
1975, the trend of negligent oversight of the intelligence agencies by congressional 
committees began to turn already between 1973 and 1974 with the two investigations by 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. First, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations conducted hearings to investigate the role of 
ITT in Chile during 1970. The ITT-CIA investigation and hearings regarding détente in 
Chile laid the groundwork for a large-scale investigation into US covert involvement there. 
The Committee’s investigation uncovered that the CIA used the American corporation ITT 
to funnel money into Chile. CIA agents used this money to fund anti-Allende propaganda 
leading up to the 1970 election.11 After Allende’s election, the CIA used the funding to 
support efforts to spread propaganda that instilled doubt regarding his economic policies 
and politics with the goal of encouraging an overthrow of his government.12 This 
revelation of US covert influence abroad, aided by a US corporation, was the first 
disclosure of the realities of US covert involvement abroad for those on the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. 
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 One of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations members impacted by the 
shocking revelation that the CIA conspired with ITT to block the election and destabilize 
the presidency of Allende was Senator Frank Church. Not being a member of the Senate 
Committee on the Armed Services tasked with overseeing the intelligence agencies, 
Senator Church was unaware of the past US covert involvement in Chile. With the 
revelation of CIA and ITT efforts to topple Allende, Senator Church discovered that with 
the exception of the White House and members of the House and Senate Committees on 
the Armed Forces, both Congress and the American public were unaware of the 
misconduct of the intelligence agencies. The misconduct of the CIA in Chile demonstrated 
that no oversight committee knew enough about these activities to do its job and oversee 
them. Instead, the CIA embarked on ineffective and subversive activities that worked to 
undermine the democratic process of another nation with minimal oversight from 
Congress.13 
The revelations from the ITT-CIA hearing introduced members of the committee, 
like Senator Frank Church, to the true extent of CIA covert involvement in Chile. Now, 
instead of being content with an investigation limited to an in-depth look at the role of 
multinational corporations in foreign policy, Senator Church pushed for a larger inquiry 
into the activities of the CIA in Chile and other operations conducted by the intelligence 
agencies without sufficient oversight.14 In the midst of the hearings on the ITT and CIA, 
news reached the US that a military coup overthrew President Allende and Chile was 
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under the control of a military junta. The ITT-CIA investigation revealed only a small part 
of CIA covert activities in Chile to Senator Church, but the greater pattern of White House 
abuse of the intelligence agencies that it hinted at continued to be exposed by subsequent 
events in Congress.  
The second key congressional hearing that set up the creation of the Church 
Committee was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on Détente. The 
Committee conducted hearings to consider US relations with communist countries and the 
efficacy of détente as a means to normalize relations. In light of the US’ fear that the 
Soviet Union influenced Allende and the White House’s application of the term 
“communist” to Allende’s politics, the Committee included Chile in its hearings.15 The 
hearings included the testimony of Henry Kissinger, now Secretary of State, who Senator 
Church interrogated at length about his knowledge of CIA activities in Chile during 1970.  
For the section of the hearing dedicated to Chile, Senator Church turned the conversation 
from détente to covert intervention in Chile.  
When given the opportunity to question Secretary Kissinger, Senator Church was 
tenacious in forcing him to explain US activities in Chile. This initiated several abrupt 
interruptions while each man spoke, with Senator Church asking Secretary Kissinger, “Mr. 
Secretary, in all deference to you, my question was –” to which Secretary Kissinger 
responded “I will deal with the substance of your question next.”16 Secretary Kissinger was 
not eager to discuss details relating to US covert involvement in Chile, and instead 
dismissed this topic by saying that the Committee was “talking about something that was 
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carried out by procedures in which all the branches of Government participated according 
to practices that had been established in the entire post-war period—something that was a 
regular operation.”17 Although the topic of the hearing was meant to be détente, Church 
persisted in asking Secretary Kissinger about US covert involvement in Chile: 
Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, the practice of this committee has been to give 
members of this committee an opportunity to ask questions of this character, and I 
would like the Secretary to tell me how we can reconcile this kind of intervention 
with moral law which we are supposed to respect, with treaty law, with 
international law, or with any law other than the law of the jungle.18 
 
Not only interested in the details of US covert involvement in Chile, Senator 
Church wanted to know the White House’s moral justification for their conduct that 
interfered in the democratic process of another nation. After questioning Secretary 
Kissinger at length regarding the justification and legality of CIA activities in Chile by 
Senator Church, the Chairman prompted him to save the line of questioning since there 
would be a future action on this subject. With the détente hearings already uncovering the 
extensive nature of US covert involvement in Chile, a committee dedicated to intelligence 
activities would need to conduct a thorough investigation of its own.  
Yet it took more than Senator Church’s commitment to holding the intelligence 
agencies accountable to force the actual formation of a committee to investigate the matter. 
By the end of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on Détente, Senator 
Church’s commitment to conducting a comprehensive investigation of the intelligence 
agencies was clear. Yet his was not the only voice calling for accountability; major 
national newspapers also joined in the call. The investigative reporting into intelligence 
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agencies’ abuse occurring at major newspapers around the country caught the attention of 
both Congress and the US public. Senator Church’s persistent questioning of intelligence 
agencies in hearings and committees, and his calls for oversight, introduced the idea of 
forming a comprehensive committee to investigate to Congress. Congress prepared to hold 
the Nixon White House accountable for exploiting the intelligence agencies just as it had 
held it accountable for the Watergate scandal. 
Investigative reporting in national newspapers fueled public interest in intelligence 
agency’s activities at home and abroad. The press covered the investigation and hearings of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, including some of the earliest mentions of US 
covert involvement in Chile.19 Seymour Hersh, writing for the New York Times, revealed 
CIA abuses abroad with his article on the CIA’s “family jewels.”20 The “family jewels,” 
the CIA’s file on its own abuses and potentially illegal activities, was a breakthrough that 
connected mere accusations of misbehavior by the CIA with the agency’s own list of its 
crimes at home and abroad.21 It also, for the first time, was a public reveal of CIA covert 
involvement in assassination attempts.22 Articles by Hersh and other reporters about 
assassination plots published throughout 1975 helped to keep this topic on the minds of the 
American public throughout the course of the Church Committee investigation.23 This was 
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the first time that possible CIA involvement in the assassination involving foreign leaders, 
like General Schneider, was made public. Together, pressure from Senator Church inside 
Congress and the US public outside Congress forced the Senate, House of Representatives, 
and the White House to establish committees and a commission to inquire into intelligence 
activities.24 Public and congressional demands for accountability could no longer be 
ignored. Oversight committees could no longer shut their eyes to the abuses of the 
intelligence agencies, and the reality of the agencies’ actions at home and abroad would be 
revealed to Congress and the public.25 
In the détente hearings, Senator Church did not drop his insistence that Secretary 
Kissinger explain these actions. Nor did the US public and numerous members of 
Congress, who also demanded an investigation and explanation for the stories of US covert 
activities displayed across the front pages. Three months after the détente hearings, 
Democratic Senator John Pastore introduced Senate Resolution 21 on January 21, 1975, 
calling for the establishment of “a select committee of the Senate to conduct an 
investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence 
activities.”26 A vote of 82 – 4 officially established the Church Committee on January 27, 
1975.27 
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The Church Committee. In January of 1975, the Church Committee began its 
seventeen month investigation into intelligence activities.28 From the start, the Church 
Committee was in a uniquely qualified position to deliver a comprehensive and thorough 
investigation of the US intelligence agencies due to two factors. First, the eleven-member 
committee chaired by Senator Church (D-ID) was not split into seven Democrats and four 
Republicans as was the norm for a committee led by a Democratic chairman.29 Instead, the 
Committee had a bipartisan structure with six Democrats and five Republicans. The 
Democratic members of the Committee were Philip Hart (MI), Walter Mondale (MN), 
Walter Muddleston (KY), Robert Morgan (NC), and Gary Hart (CO). The Republican 
members of the Committee were John Tower (TX) who served as Vice Chairman, Howard 
Baker, Jr. (TN), Barry Goldwater (AZ), Charles Mathias, Jr. (MD), and Richard Schweiker 
(PA).  
Second, the Committee’s status as a “select” committee allowed the Senate 
majority and minority leaders to select the committee’s members.30 In order to conduct an 
unbiased investigation, no senators who served on the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, previously responsible for intelligence oversight, were on the Committee.31 
Every member of the Committee had no direct previous experience in congressional 
oversight of the intelligence agencies, and therefore they would not be “reluctant to expose 
previous inadequate oversight.”32  
                                                          
28 Ashby, “Church Committee’s History,” 22. 
29 Schwarz, Democracy in the Dark, 176-177. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
54 
 
 The Church Committee’s investigation focused on questions of accountability for 
the abuses committed by the intelligence agencies.33 The Committee also wanted to stress 
the importance of congressional oversight of the intelligence agencies, and the necessity of 
committed, continuous congressional review of its activities.34 Frederick A.O. Schwarz, 
serving as chief counsel to the Committee, characterized the investigation as the “first - 
and still the most wide-ranging - investigation of America’s secret government.”35  
 A broad overview of the many different aspects of the Church Committee’s 
investigation reveals the wide scope of intelligence activities it scrutinized. Domestically, 
the Committee investigated the activities of the CIA, NSA, FBI, and IRS from the 1960s to 
the 1970s, such as the CIA’s program to collect information on the political activities of 
US citizens.36 It also investigated the opening of US mail by the CIA and FBI, the CIA’s 
mind control experiments codenamed MK-ULTRA, and the NSA’s Project SHAMROCK 
with its Watch List of “subversive” US citizens.37 The majority of the activities covered by 
the investigation were a part of the CIA’s “family jewels” published by Seymour Hersh.38 
Almost all of the activities investigated occurred inside of the US, with the exception of 
the assassination plots involving foreign leaders. This makes the investigation into 
assassination plots even more prominent, because it was the only example of intelligence 
activities that occurred outside of the US investigated by the Committee. The Church 
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Committee considered it equally important to address CIA abuses that occurred outside of 
the US as the ones that occurred inside of the US. In this moment of accountability 
occurring in congress and the US public, the activities of the intelligence agencies both at 
home and abroad were subjected to serious congressional inquiry whether the victims were 
US citizens or not. 
The Rockefeller Commission and Pike Committee. The three groups began to 
investigate the intelligence agencies in early 1975, but the Church Committee lasted the 
longest and completed the most thorough and comprehensive investigation into 
intelligence activities domestic and foreign. Neither the House of Representatives’ 
committee nor the White House’s commission had the scope or depth of the Church 
Committee in tackling the various facets of abuse in the intelligence.  
The Ford White House created the United States President's Commission on CIA 
Activities within the United States. Called the Rockefeller Committee due to the leadership 
of Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and lasting for six months, the commission focused 
on CIA activities inside of the US. Created by President Ford to stop a legislative “circus,” 
the commission focused solely on questions of accountability for covert activities 
conducted by intelligence agencies, but the planned investigation did not include 
assassination plots involving foreign leaders.39 To those involved in the simultaneous 
activity of the Church Committee, it appeared that the Rockefeller Commission wanted to 
seize control of the intelligence investigations and render the work of the Church 
Committee unnecessary.40 
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Yet the Church Committee already made it clear that the issue of assassination 
plots involving foreign leaders would be an area of focus in its investigation. For two brief 
months, President Ford extended the commission’s lifetime to take on the question of 
assassination plots. Yet by May 25, 1975, it became apparent that the topic of assassination 
plots was too sensitive for the Rockefeller Commission to address.41 The potential for the 
investigation into assassination plots to antagonize the intelligence agencies when 
conducted by the White House was deemed too great for the Rockefeller Commission.42 
The Rockefeller Commission’s limited scope was insufficient compared to the Church 
Committee, which simultaneously operated with a much larger scope that included 
assassination plots. It would be left to the Church Committee to investigate assassination 
plots involving foreign leaders. 
Established by the House of Representatives, the House Select Committee on 
Intelligence also did not succeed in addressing issues of intelligence agencies’ abuses to 
the level of the Church Committee. Called the Pike Committee after its chairman 
Representative Otis Pike and lasting for twelve months, the committee focused on the 
weaknesses in the collection and analysis of intelligence by the intelligence agencies.43 
This was an intentional difference between the Pike and Church Committees; the two 
chairmen planned in advance that their investigations would address different intelligence 
issues.44 Chairman Otis Pike described the Pike Committee as an examination of 
“intelligence costs and fiscal procedures, the performance of the intelligence community - 
including some specific intelligence failures - and domestic intelligence programs not 
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studied by the Church Committee.”45 While the Pike Committee did produce a report that 
included CIA covert involvement in Chile, it mainly focused on the failures of the White 
House to follow the CIA’s advice that the kidnapping of Schneider would not stimulate a 
coup.46 The Pike Committee’s focus on the failures of the CIA and White House branch to 
interpret intelligence meant that the Committee only included examples of the CIA’s 
activities as an argument for the necessity of intelligence oversight.47  
 Although formed within two months of the Pike Committee and Rockefeller 
Commission, the Church Committee outlasted both by several months. The length of the 
Committee was due in part to the expanded boundaries of investigation into intelligence 
activities. The Senate Resolution that formed the Church Committee stated that its mission 
was “to conduct an investigation of Government intelligence activities, including the 
extent to which any illegal or improper activities were engaged in.”48 Unlike the Pike 
Committee’s concentration on intelligence collection and the weaknesses of intelligence 
interpretation, the Church Committee focused on accountability in intelligence activities.49 
A specific topic addressed by the Committee was “the need for legislative authority to 
govern the operations of any intelligence agencies.”50 Like the Rockefeller Commission, 
the Church Committee conducted its investigation with the final goal of suggesting new 
and revised means of Congressional oversight of intelligence agencies.51 However, unlike 
the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Committee did not fear antagonizing the 
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intelligence agencies.52 The Church Committee’s position in the legislative branch gave it 
the independence to conduct an investigation unimpeded by internal conflicts. 
 Senator Church’s previous involvement with the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations prepared him for his role as chairman of the Church Committee. In order to 
understand the Church Committee’s purpose and investigation it is crucial to first 
understand its chairman, Senator Frank Church. From his time on the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations he became increasingly unreserved about speaking out on US 
intervention in foreign countries, the unchecked power of Nixon’s imperial presidency, and 
the growth of a national security state inside the US.53  
Senator Church’s commitment to speaking out stemmed from his principled belief 
in following the law.54 His crusading side was well known to his associates in Congress, 
with the congressional doorkeeper accusing him of taking his name too serious and being 
“more like a cathedral” than a church.55 Concerned with the lack of oversight of the 
intelligence agencies at a time when other investigations into Nixon’s imperial presidency 
revealed abuses by the Nixon White House, Senator Church saw a moment of opportunity 
in which public outrage at the White House could easily shift to outrage over intelligence 
agencies’ actions. Senator Church also excelled at chairing a bipartisan committee 
investigating the nation’s most sensitive and inflammatory secrets. His diplomatic skills 
that allowed him to effectively mediate clashes between Committee members with a wide 
ideological spectrum permitted the Committee to steer clear of internal conflicts.56 
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With the determined leadership of Senator Church and the freedom to investigate a 
wide array of intelligence activities, the Church Committee was free to address topics that 
neither the Pike Committee nor Rockefeller Commission could. The Church Committee’s 
investigation of assassination plots involving foreign leaders was the element that set it 
apart from the other two inquiries. The Pike Committee only covered assassination plots in 
the context of weakness or failure in intelligence gathering, and the Rockefeller 
Commission backed off from investigating assassination plots when it threatened to cause 
tension within the executive branch. These failures to complete a full investigation of 
assassination plots meant that only the Church Committee conducted a thorough 
investigation into them, leading to many of the most shocking revelations of the Church 
Committee’s investigation. 
  
White House Opposition to the Church Committee 
 During the development of the intelligence investigation leading up to the Church 
Committee, the White House shifted from attempting preemptive actions to trying to 
curtail the investigation. It was not immediately clear whether the Ford White House 
would help or hinder the Church Committee’s investigation, since Senator Church made it 
clear that his Committee would leave no stone unturned in its investigation of the White 
House and its relationship with the intelligence agencies. In order to understand the White 
House’s attitude toward the Church Committee once the Committee began its 
investigation, it is necessary to trace the development of the White House’s attitude toward 
congressional investigations into intelligence activities from the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations to the Church Committee.  
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Due to reporting by The New York Times, Chicago Tribune, and Boston Globe the 
public was aware of CIA covert involvement in assassination plots involving foreign 
leaders. It was not unexpected that the Church Committee included these plots in its 
investigation after both the public outcry over them and Senator Church’s own 
commitment to addressing assassination plots. The Ford White House was not willing to 
face the intelligence agencies’ reaction when it appeared that the Rockefeller Commission 
would expand its investigation to include assassination plots involving foreign leaders. It is 
therefore not surprising that during the process of forming the Church Committee, the 
Committee struggled to make the Ford White House recognize the necessity of including 
these foreign intelligence abuses in its investigation. In the months leading up to the 
formation of the Church Committee, and particularly during the hearings and investigation 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Ford White House adamantly opposed 
Congress investigating US covert involvement in Chile. 
 At first, the Ford White House claimed that there was no need for a congressional 
investigation into intelligence activities in Chile because it characterized intelligence 
involvement there as minimal. The Ford White House first confronted the issue of 
increased congressional interest in intelligence activities in Chile during Kissinger’s 
nomination hearing as Secretary of State before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on September 17, 1973, and in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Hearings on Détente on September 18, 1974. Kissinger first faced questions about US 
covert involvement in Chile during his nomination hearings, which coincidentally took 
place only six days after the overthrow of President Allende. Following the Senate Foreign 
Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations hearings on ITT-CIA relations that 
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occurred earlier in spring of 1973, Senator McGee told Kissinger that “there is a 
suggestion that the CIA has been deeply involved in Chilean affairs over a period of time 
in one way or another. This came out in the ITT hearings, for example.”57 Kissinger 
responded that the CIA was “in a very minor way involved in the 1970 election… our 
efforts in Chile were to strengthen the democratic political parties.”58 In light of the ITT-
CIA hearings, Kissinger’s response is a severe understatement that characterizes US covert 
involvement in manipulating the 1970 election as a democratic versus socialist fight taking 
place on a Cold War battleground. 
A year later, in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on Détente, 
former director of the CIA William Colby offered a straightforward and shocking account 
of CIA covert activities in Chile.59 With the CIA director himself discussing US actions to 
destabilize Chile, the Committee wanted to hear more from Secretary Kissinger since he 
was a central figure in the Nixon White House during these events.60 Again, Kissinger 
characterizes US covert involvement in Chile in a manner similar to that during his 
nomination hearing, stating: 
What gave the Allende situation a particular character was that, having been elected 
by 36 percent, he then set about to establish what appeared to be a one-party 
government and systematically set about to throttle all opposition parties, all 
opposition press, so that the issue that was raised here was not an intervention in 
the democratic process. The issue that was raised was whether somebody elected 
with 36 percent and frankly, pursuing policies that we considered hostile to the 
United States, should then be able to establish a one-party government.61 
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In this hearing, Kissinger not only defends the specific example of US covert 
involvement in Chile, but also the practice of US covert involvement in general: 
First, the United States has been conducting various kinds of covert operations in 
the post-war period, and it may be and perhaps should be a matter of philosophical 
debate which of these are appropriate to conduct and to continue. The difficulty is 
that by the definition of covert operation, it is not easy to discuss them publicly and 
this creates certain anomalies. Secondly, all of the matters to which you refer have 
been developed by well-established procedures in the Government that have been 
consistently tightened, approved by the President and briefed to the appropriate 
committees. This does not itself make it right.62 
 
Secretary Kissinger brings up the issue of congressional oversight of the 
intelligence agencies and implicates the Committee on Armed Services, tasked with 
overseeing the intelligence agencies, for failing in its oversight capacity. He goes on to 
suggest a possible course of corrective action is a review of congressional oversight, led by 
President Ford: 
 The President had a meeting this morning with the leadership of the Congress in 
order to put before them what is involved and to point out that as far as the 
executive branch is concerned, we are prepared to work out those procedures that 
establish appropriate accountability if it is felt by the Congress that the existing 
procedures that have existed in the entire post-war period, and I repeat have been 
progressively tightened by each succeeding administration, are not adequate.  
 
By both affirming the need for covert involvement in general and specifically 
asserting the necessity of covert involvement in Chile, Kissinger continued to paint this 
involvement as both necessary and limited to ensuring the maintenance of democracy in 
Chile. He denied that US covert involvement in Chile was not sufficiently overseen by 
Congress, and discouraged any further investigation into it. 
In both sessions in front of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Secretary 
Kissinger adamantly defended the US’ covert activities. In particular, questions from 
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Committee member Senator Church regarding CIA Director Colby’s discussion of US 
covert activities in Chile did not get a definitive answer from Kissinger. He dismissed 
covert activities in Chile as “something that was carried out by procedures in which all the 
branches of Government participated according to practices that had been established in 
the entire post-war period—something that was a regular operation.”63 
For all the effort Kissinger put into publicly denying any knowledge of US plans of 
covert involvement in Chile, the formation of the Church Committee in January 1975 
signaled the start of new questions for the Ford White House surrounding this topic of 
investigation. Documents from the Ford White House reveal a palpable White House 
concern over the Church Committee’s congressional inquiry into Chile. In a January 1975 
conversation with President Ford and Deputy Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger remarks that “the Chilean thing — 
that is not in any report. That is sort of blackmail on me.”64 Kissinger felt personally 
threatened by the possible inclusion of US covert involvement in Chile in a congressional 
investigation. Later documents, examined in the next chapter, demonstrate that Kissinger’s 
paranoia only increased as the Committee’s investigation continued and reached a peak 
when he learned that the Committee planned on investigating the death of General 
Schneider for its interim report. 
President Ford also faced questions about US covert involvement in Chile, but he 
did not offer a public answer until after the Church Committee began its investigation. 
Even though these questions occurred approximately a year after Secretary Kissinger’s 
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hearing in front of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, President Ford’s response 
was similar to Kissinger’s in that he reaffirmed the necessity of covert operations to protect 
the US. During a presidential news conference in September 1975, reporter Godfrey 
Sperling Jr. asked President Ford about testimony heard by the Church Committee that 
“the CIA, under the direction of a committee headed by Dr. Kissinger, attempted to 
destabilize the Government of Chile under former President Allende. Is it the policy of 
your Administration to attempt to destabilize the governments of other democracies?”65 
The President answered that the US government, “like other governments, does take 
certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect 
national security. I am informed reliably that Communist nations spend vastly more money 
than we do for the same kind of purpose.”66 President Ford added that information about 
covert operations 
…is relayed to the responsible Congressional committees where it is reviewed by 
House and Senate committees. It seems to me that the 40 Committee should 
continue in existence, and I am going to meet with the responsible Congressional 
committees to see whether or not they want any changes in the review process so 
that the Congress, as well as the President, are fully informed and are fully included 
in the operations for any such action.67 
 
President Ford adopted an appearance that he was willing to work with the 
“responsible Congressional committees” tasked with reforming intelligence oversight. 
However, this willingness to work with Congress to reform congressional oversight of the 
intelligence agencies had limits. In a Cabinet meeting the day after his news conference, 
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President Ford emphatically stated that “we need a CIA and we need covet operations.”68 
President Ford’s defense of CIA activities in Chile took on a similar tone of Cold War 
necessity that Secretary Kissinger used a year earlier. President Ford defended the CIA’s 
covert activities since communist countries spend “vastly more money than we do for the 
same kind of purpose.”69 Word of this statement made by the President quickly reached the 
public, and when asked about it by a group of Georgetown University students in the 
School of Foreign Service, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft assured the undergraduates that the President “was just 
pointing out that they [Communists] spend a lot.”70 
 In later comments on the division between the legislative and executive branches, 
President Ford characterized congressional oversight of intelligence activities as intrusive. 
He argued that for issues of foreign policy the Constitution “plainly puts the responsibility 
for such decisions on the shoulders of the President of the United States. There are 
institutional limitations on the Congress which cannot be legislated away.”71 Yet Cold War 
justifications did not satisfy members of Congress like Senator Church who were not 
swayed from their intent to investigate the intelligence agencies for actions like those in 
Chile in the early 1970s. CIA Director Colby’s testimony to the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations revealed the true extent of US covert activities in Chile and Secretary 
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Kissinger’s testimony only further complicated the narrative of US covert involvement in 
Chile, and accusations of intelligence agency misdeeds intensified. 
 President Ford already faced the monumental task of rebuilding the nation’s trust in 
the presidency after the Watergate scandal and resignation of President Nixon. In the 
aftermath of these political scandals President Ford not only wanted to appear open and 
cooperative with the other branches of government; he had to be after President Nixon’s 
abuse of the law and the power of the presidency led to his resignation.72 After being 
confirmed as President Nixon’s vice president not by election but by appointment, 
President Ford carefully avoided any actions that would implicate him in President 
Nixon’s abuses of power.73 The end of Nixon’s imperial presidency meant that President 
Ford would have to confront allegations of abuse inside the intelligence agencies under his 
control. With congressional investigations into intelligence activities overseeing the 
intelligence agencies, the President could no longer ignore the legality of the intelligence 
agencies’ activities and order them to conduct illegal activities. However, President Ford 
did at first try his best to preempt the congressional investigations with the Rockefeller 
Commission. However, it could not match the Church Committee’s broad scope and 
ability to receive extensions to its existence in order to conduct a thorough investigation.74 
 
The Committee’s Purpose for Investigating Assassination Plots 
 The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations established the intent of Senator 
Church, and the Committee he chaired, to investigate the intelligence agencies’ covert 
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activities. However, it was not immediately clear that the scope of the Committee’s 
investigation would include assassination plots involving foreign leaders. As previously 
noted, Senator Church expressed interest in further investigating US covert involvement in 
Chile during the Senate Foreign Relations Hearings on Détente. Additionally newspaper 
articles as early as January 1975 demonstrate public interest in assassination plots 
involving foreign leaders, not long after the Church Committee formally began. As the 
Church Committee began its investigation in January of 1975, the media already began to 
discuss both US covert involvement in Chile and assassination plots involving foreign 
leaders.75 
The Church Committee’s inquiry into assassination plots involving foreign leaders 
was in part spurred by what it already knew about US covert involvement in Chile, but it 
was also spurred by the desire to uncover the details of the exact activities conducted in 
Chile. The Committee’s questions that guided its investigation were, according to staff 
assistant Loch Johnson, “to whom are the intelligence agencies responsible?…Who got us 
into Chile? Who got us into all over the world, and under whose authority, and why was 
Congress not told?”76 The most compelling example of covert activity in Chile was the 
potential US covert involvement in the botched kidnapping and subsequent assassination 
of General Schneider. From the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearings a year 
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earlier, Senator Church knew that US covert involvement in Chile extended beyond 
funneling financial support to Allende’s opponents, but details such as the plot to kidnap 
General Schneider to initiate a coup were not known. By July 1975, reporting by US media 
discussed the committee’s plan to investigate assassination plots involving foreign leaders:  
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will limit its investigation of covert 
activities by the Central Intelligence Agency to a “half-dozen or so representative 
case,” including the intervention in Chile, the committee chairman said today… He 
[Senator Church] said that the committee planned to ask Mr. Colby about the death 
in October, 1970, of Gen. Rene Schneider… Press reports have suggested that the 
CIA may have had some involvement in General Schneider’s death.77 
 
These early reports on the investigation into assassination plots also make clear the 
intention of Senator Church to publicly disclose the information gathered by the 
investigation.78 Senator Church believed that the findings about “CIA murder attempts and 
murder attempts abroad” would be one of the most important aspects of the Committee’s 
investigation.79 
As the Church Committee conducted its investigation into US covert involvement 
in assassination plots involving foreign leaders, investigations into other aspects of 
domestic intelligence agencies activities occurred simultaneously. Yet Senator Church 
continued to propel the investigation into assassination plots forward, even when 
Committee staff members feared it diverted precious time and resources away from other 
concurrent investigations.80 Senator Church disagreed with other staffers who feared that it 
was leading them into a swamp because he “knew we had to face it.”81 The determination 
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Senator Church showed during the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ investigation 
and other hearings about US covert activities in Chile carried over to the investigation into 
assassination plots involving foreign leaders. Senator Church’s recognition of the 
importance of addressing the difficult and grim topic of US covert involvement in 
assassination plots saw the Committee through the investigation. 
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Chapter 3: The Church Committee Investigates Assassination Plots 
 After the long process of forming a committee, facing White House opposition, and 
defining what would set the committee apart from the other intelligence investigations, the 
Church Committee finally began its investigation. By the time the Church Committee’s 
mandate expired in 1976, the Committee acquired documents, compiled exhibits, and 
invited witnesses to testify. The true scope and depth of the Committee’s investigation is 
apparent when looking at its final result: 14 reports totaling 5,221 pages. These 14 reports 
were split into seven volumes, six books, and one interim report.1 These reports covered 
the intelligence agencies in detail from their formation, operations, and the alleged abuses 
of law and power they committed.  
 Described as the most extensive review of intelligence activities ever made 
available to the public, the Church Committee went into previously unparalleled detail 
about intelligence activities. The seven volumes included transcripts of public hearings and 
accompanying exhibits, divided into the categories of hearings on unauthorized storage of 
toxic agents, the Huston Plan, the Internal Revenue Service, mail opening, the National 
Security and Fourth Amendment rights, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and covert 
action.2 The books of the Committee’s writings covered the topics of foreign and military 
intelligence, intelligence activities and the rights of Americans, supplementary detailed 
staff reports on intelligence activities and the rights of Americans, supplementary detailed 
staff reports on foreign and military intelligence, the investigation of the assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy and the performance of the intelligence agencies, and 
                                                          
1 “Church Committee Reports,” Mary Ferrell Foundation, accessed February 18, 2018, 
https://www.maryferrell.org/php/showlist.php?docset=1014. 
2 Ibid. 
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supplementary reports on intelligence activities.3 The final report was the interim report 
Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. It was a public disclosure of many 
of the US’ most closely guarded secrets about assassination plots involving foreign leaders 
over the previous decades. The interim report contextualized the death of General 
Schneider within the broader circumstances of alleged US assassination plots involving 
foreign leaders. 
 Taken together, the 14 reports are the outcome of the Committee’s “determination 
to expose and correct intelligence agencies’ abuse of civil liberties and violations of law.”4 
Not only did these reports detail the various abuses of the intelligence agencies, but they 
also issued recommendations that the executive and legislative branches could follow to 
end these abuses.5 The legislative branch’s three decades of a “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
attitude toward US intelligence activities was over.6 The Church Committee marked a 
definitive end to nearly unilateral White House control and the beginning of congressional 
oversight of the intelligence agencies. To the Church Committee’s chief council, Frederick 
A.O. Schwarz, the purpose of committees investigating the intelligence agencies was “to 
understand the past and to propose guidance for the future… [They] must investigate past 
wrongdoing and mistakes.”7 Those who were a part of the Church Committee understood 
that it achieved what no congressional body had before: the creation of a functioning 
system of congressional oversight of the intelligence agencies. 
                                                          
3 Ibid. 
4 Russell A. Miller, “Introduction: U.S. national security, intelligence and democracy: from the Church 
Committee to the War on Terror,” in US national security, intelligence and democracy: from the Church 
Committee to the War on Terror, ed. Russell A. Miller (London: Routledge, 2008), 1. 
5 Gary Hart, “Liberty and security,” in US National Security, Intelligence and Democracy: From the Church 
Committee to the War on Terror, ed. Russell A. Miller (London: Routledge, 2008), 15. 
6 Schwarz, Democracy in the Dark, 175. 
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 The Church Committee’s decision to investigate the alleged assassination plots 
involving foreign leaders marked a watershed moment in defining the unlimited executive 
power over intelligence activities in previous administrations and demonstrating the 
necessity of congressional inquiry and accountability in intelligence. The Committee’s 
interim report demonstrated the Church Committee’s willingness to look at intelligence 
abuses outside of the US. Although the Committee also marked the first serious inquiry 
into intelligence abuses inside the US, looking at foreign abuses showed a greater 
awareness for the negative impact of US intelligence activities in other countries. The 
importance of the US on the world stage extended beyond formal diplomacy; the US was 
also responsible for covertly manipulating countries around the world for the US’ own best 
interest. Countries like Chile showed that the US’ official stance of promoting peace, 
liberty, and democracy was not reflective of its true attitude towards the country when 
covert activities reflected unbridled hostility and aggression. The Church Committee’s 
willingness to examine assassination plots involving foreign leaders makes it clear that it 
viewed abuses outside the US against foreign leaders as just as unacceptable as the 
intelligence abuses that occurred in the US.  
With the interim report of alleged assassination plots involving foreign leaders, the 
Committee united the two separate threads that propelled the Committee into existence. 
One thread was the issue of covert involvement in Chile, which motivated Senator Church 
to uncover the extent of US intelligence abuses that occurred in Chile. As the investigation 
into covert involvement in Chile progressed, it became a part of a much larger issue around 
the world: assassination plots. The other thread was the alleged assassination plots 
involving foreign leaders; one of which was the plot to kidnap General Schneider that 
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turned into an assassination. In particular, the Committee’s investigation into the death of 
General Schneider marked a new willingness to uncover, and confront, the very worst of 
US foreign policy during the Cold War. The Church Committee looked at his death and 
understood that it, and the situation in Chile in which it occurred, was a prime example of 
the lengths that the US went to achieve its desired outcome in a foreign country. As a 
result of the interim report, and its revelations of the actions of the CIA and Nixon White 
House surrounding the death of General Schneider, congressional oversight went from 
happening pro forma to concrete reality. 
  
The Church Committee’s Investigation 
 Before delving into the effects of the interim report on the assassination plots 
involving foreign leaders and the role that General Schneider’s death played in it and how 
it was instrumental in changing the way Congress handled intelligence affairs, it is 
important to understand the creation of the report. Throughout the summer and fall of 1975 
the Church Committee worked to investigate the assassination plots of the five foreign 
leaders chosen as the best examples of US covert involvement in these plots.8 In the 
process of forming the Church Committee, two major issues stood out for Senator Church: 
US covert involvement in Chile and assassination plots involving foreign leaders. In the 
investigation leading to the interim report, the death of General Schneider tied the topic of 
US covert involvement in Chile in closely with alleged assassination plots involving 
foreign leaders. 
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 As the Committee worked to investigate both covert involvement in Chile and the 
broader question of assassination plots involving foreign leaders and write its interim 
report, the Ford White House resisted. This was especially true in regards to the 
investigation into General Schneider’s death. The actions of the Ford White House 
revealed that General Schneider’s death was a key example of the abuses of US covert 
activities in other countries. The death of General Schneider united the Church 
Committee’s two threads of covert involvement in Chile and the assassination plots 
involving foreign leaders, and the investigation into his death demonstrates the lengths 
both the Ford White House and Church Committee were willing to go to control the 
information surrounding his death. The Ford White House wanted to hide its involvement 
in his death from the public and maintain its public stance that its involvement in Chile did 
not involve anything as clearly impermissible as a kidnapping plot that led to an 
assassination. The Church Committee, on the other hand, was singularly committed to 
carrying out its investigation even in the face of White House resistance. The Committee 
would negotiate with the White House over issues of secrecy and public knowledge, but it 
would not budge in including the assassination of General Schneider as one of the 
examples of the US plotting to assassinate foreign leaders.  
Staff Report. The first product of the Church Committee’s investigation into 
assassination plots involving foreign leaders was the staff report Covert Action in Chile, 
1963-1973. The staff report was included as an appendix in Book VI of the Church 
Committee Reports Supplementary Reports on Intelligence Activities. The creation of the 
staff report ran parallel with the creation of the interim report and was published a month 
after the interim report. It was the compilation of all of research done by the Committee 
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into covert action in Chile, and its stated purpose was to “lay out the basic facts of covert 
action in Chile to enable the Committee to hold public hearings. This report is based on an 
extensive review of documents of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Departments of 
State and Defense, and the National Security Council; and on testimony by officials and 
former officials.”9 The report was just one piece of the Committee’s investigation into US 
covert activities in Chile and included supplemental information for the wider investigation 
of US covert involvement abroad. Its goal was to present an “accurate picture of the scope, 
purposes and magnitude of United States covert action in Chile.”10 This outline of the facts 
and motivations of US covert activities in Chile was a critical step in helping to form the 
Committee’s knowledge of CIA abuses. The interim report would dive much deeper into 
one facet of US covert involvement in Chile that the report briefly outlined: the 
assassination of General Schneider.11 
 Although the staff report did not detail the death of General Schneider in depth, it 
did provide context for his death and raised questions. These questions came up again in 
the interim report when it examined the role of his death in the bigger picture of US covert 
involvement in Chile. In the staff report, the planning of his kidnapping is recognized as 
the pivotal moment in which the CIA directly tried to intervene in stopping the ratification 
of Allende’s electoral victory. The report outlines how the CIA  
…attempted, directly, to foment a military coup in Chile. It passed three weapons 
to a group of Chilean officers who plotted a coup. Beginning with the kidnapping 
of Chilean Army Commander-in-Chief René Schneider. However, those guns were 
returned. The group, which staged the abortive kidnap of Schneider, which resulted 
                                                          
9 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, III. 
10 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee, Covert Action, III. 
11 See also: Letter, William B. Bader to Mr. Seymour Bolten, 10/17/1975, folder: Marsh, John O.: Files, 
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in his death, apparently was not the same as the group which received CIA 
weapons.12 
 
Yet the report goes on to make clear that his death involved the US when it posed 
the question, “Was the United States directly involved, covertly, in the 1973 coup in 
Chile?”13 The report goes on to answer “The Committee has found no evidence that it was. 
However, the United States sought in 1970 to foment a military coup in Chile; after 1970 it 
adopted a policy both overt and covert, of opposition to Allende; and it remained in 
intelligence contact with the Chilean military, including officers who were participating in 
coup plotting.”14 While there is minimal discussion of General Schneider’s assassination in 
the staff report, it set the stage for the main focus of the investigation on assassination plots 
involving foreign leaders: the abuses and lack of oversight of the intelligence agencies, and 
in this case specifically the CIA. 
 The staff report touched on more than just the facts of covert activities in Chile; it 
included the questions that these activities raised about the nature of US covert 
involvement in Chile, Latin America, and the world. It took into account the Committee’s 
purpose to “conduct an investigation of Government intelligence activities, including the 
extent to which any illegal or improper activities were engaged in” and to address the 
“need for legislative authority to govern the operations of any intelligence agencies” as 
stated in the resolution forming the Committee.15 In the broader investigation of US 
intelligence activities the staff report found that “the pattern of United States covert action 
in Chile is striking but not unique. It arose in the context not only of American foreign 
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13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 S. 21, 94th Cong. (1975).  
77 
 
policy, but also of US covert involvement in other countries within and outside Latin 
America. The scale of CIA involvement in Chile was unusual but by no means 
unprecedented.”16 The report demonstrates the Committee’s awareness of other examples 
of CIA covert activities abroad and its understanding of the lack of proper oversight of 
CIA covert activities around the world. The issue of the lack of oversight is addressed in 
two of the four overarching questions the report asked: 
(2) How was this major covert action program authorized and directed? What roles 
were played by the President, the 40 Committee, the CIA, the Ambassadors, and 
the Congress? (3) Did U.S. policy-makers take into account the judgments of the 
intelligence analysts on Chile when they formulated and approved US covert 
operations? Does the Chilean experience illustrate an inherent conflict between the 
role of the Director of Central Intelligence as a producer of intelligence and his role 
as manager of covert operations?17 
 
The staff report posed the questions, framed for the specific incidents of US covert 
involvement in Chile, which the Church Committee sought to answer in its mission to 
reform intelligence activities. That the Committee’s findings on covert activities in Chile 
were so extensive that they needed their own staff report demonstrates the depth of the 
Committee’s investigation and its dedication to following up on the specific instances, like 
US covert involvement in Chile, that initially motivated Senator Church to pursue an 
investigation of the US intelligence agencies. Covert involvement in Chile was a 
motivating factor for Senator Church to begin his investigation into the CIA and he made 
sure that the Committee followed up with an investigation of the CIA’s abuses that he 
uncovered during the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
Testimonies. As the Committee created the staff report that dove deeper into US 
covert activities in Chile, it also worked to investigate the assassination plots that formed 
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17 Ibid., 3. 
78 
 
the interim report Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. This interim 
report became one of the fourteen volumes of the Church Committee Reports. The process 
of investigation of these alleged assassination plots, and especially the plot involving 
General Schneider, put the Committee in direct conflict with the Ford White House. In the 
process of trying to obtain information for its investigation into alleged assassination plots 
involving foreign leaders, the assassination of General Schneider exemplified the tension 
that existed between the Church Committee and the Ford White House. The conflict over 
evidence regarding his death created much of this tension, but the Committee would 
eventually triumph in obtaining the information needed for a complete investigation of 
assassination plots.18 
 The first issue faced by the Church Committee when looking to obtain information 
from the White House was a seeming disconnect between the White House and the CIA. 
Loch Johnson, special assistant to Senator Church during his time chairing the Church 
Committee, recollected that “the trail of evidence on assassination was at times easily 
traced, only to disappear completely or, at best, fray apart in a bewildering pattern like the 
ends of a shattered nerve. Frustratingly, the break would occur most often at the critical 
synapse between the White House and the CIA.”19 With the focus of the investigation into 
alleged assassination plots involving foreign leaders focused on the role the White House 
played in dictating the CIA’s roles in these assassination plots, this was a critical 
connection. To get a clearer picture of the connection between the White House and CIA, 
                                                          
18 For more information see also: Letter, William B. Bader to Mr. Seymour Bolten, 10/17/1975, folder: 
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the Committee began calling CIA officials to testify to the nature of the relationship 
between the Nixon White House and the CIA. This eventually led to approximately 24 
hours of “probing” by the Committee throughout the course of 1975.20  
 In February of 1975 the Committee called former CIA Director Richard Helms to 
testify. His incredibly frank testimony acknowledged that there was “no doubt” in 1970 
that the Nixon White House wanted to make sure that Allende did not become president.21 
The most shocking revelation to come from his testimony was the first confirmation from 
an official serving during the Nixon administration that there was US covert involvement 
in the kidnapping plot that led to the assassination of General Schneider. The Committee 
immediately honed in on his mention of the assassination of General Schneider, and the 
association of the Nixon White House to the plot. The Republican counsel for the 
Committee, Mr. Smothers, asked about the authorization of the plot: “we are a bit unclear 
as to how one might arrive at and maintain the idea that certain activities surrounding 
assassination were, I believe, to use your words, completely authorized, how one might 
entertain this feeling.”22 Helms’ surprising candor about US covert involvement in Chile 
set the stage for the Church Committee’s increasingly deliberate questioning of other 
officials about the exact nature of the involvement. Now the Committee knew that US 
involvement in Chile extended far beyond the benevolent financial aid given to anti-
Allende supporters that Secretary Kissinger suggested in 1974. Richard Helms was the first 
official from the Nixon presidency to offer definitive testimony that the US participated in 
                                                          
20 Ibid., 7. 
21 Seymour M. Hersh, “Helms Said Nixon Sought Chile Coup,” NYT, February 10, 1975, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1975/02/10/archives/helms-said-nixon-sought-chile-coup-testimony-on-the-
overthrow-of.html 
22 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities, Testimony of Richard Helms, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 60. 
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a plot to stop Allende from becoming president that led to the assassination of General 
Schneider. 
 In May 1975 the Committee called acting CIA Director William Colby to testify 
further about the CIA’s assassination plots involving foreign leaders. President Ford’s top 
advisors quickly protested, arguing that Colby’s testimony should only contain general 
information about CIA activities to avoid any sensitive information getting out.23 Privately, 
their concerns were that his testimony could negatively impact the White House. Aware of 
how mention of assassination plots involving foreign leaders in testimony from a CIA 
official could implicate the White House, Secretary Kissinger told President Ford in a 
private meeting that he thought “the executive branch is in serious trouble.”24 However, the 
Church Committee had the full authority to call a hearing under the terms of the 
Committee’s establishment, so the White House could not stop Colby from testifying.25  
Colby’s testimony would not deal in the specifics of assassination plots; instead, he 
discussed the motivating factors behind US intelligence operations in foreign countries.26 
He framed intelligence activities as part of the US’ moral obligation to help other nations 
combat Communism, and one way the US helped was through covert activities.27 Without 
Colby even going into specific examples the White House believed that Colby gained “a 
reputation for being candid and cooperative with Congress - too much so.”28 Yet Colby’s 
limited cooperation with the Committee, but candor about CIA activities abroad, made the 
                                                          
23 United States. National Security Council. Staff, “[Israel; Church Committee; Turkey; Portugal; Iran],” 
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Committee aware that it could dig deeper in its investigation to move from the reasoning 
behind assassination plots to concrete examples.29 Like Richard Helms, Colby’s candid 
testimony in front of the Committee led the Committee even deeper into the specific 
details of US covert involvement. Senator Church continued to persevere in following the 
investigation into assassination plots all the way through. During the testimony of CIA 
Director Colby, Senator Church commented that “once an agency begins to engage in 
assassination attempts the disease spreads. Your own testimony shows it spread at least as 
far as the Dominican Republic and we are going to get into closer questions on others 
matters such as Lumumba and Chile.”30 Colby recalled later that “while the heat from the 
Church Committee was on the CIA, the White House told us not to cooperate … but when 
the heat began to move toward the White House, they began to give up papers.”31 One of 
the set of papers that the Committee pushed for the White House to release was those 
relating to the assassination plots involving foreign leaders.32 
 
The Investigation Reaches the White House 
The Committee continued to be frustrated by the White House’s slow response to 
its document requests and interference in the testimony of CIA officials. The investigation 
began to gravitate away from the CIA, who remained unwilling to give specific details 
about assassination plots, and towards the White House. With the Committee’s attention 
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turned toward the White House, officials there faced questions about the White House’s 
knowledge of assassination plots involving foreign leaders. 
As the Church Committee’s investigation shifted away from the CIA and closer 
towards the White House, the questions driving its investigation expanded. The Committee 
expanded from just focusing on the CIA to examining the relationship between the CIA 
and White House, and any control the White House exercised over the CIA. The 
Committee suspected that permission for the CIA to proceed with assassination plots may 
have come directly from the White House, and not the CIA. The investigation into the CIA 
focused on the question of whether US intelligence activities in foreign countries included 
assassination plots involving foreign leaders. Now, as the Church Committee expanded its 
investigation to the White House, it began to focus on the question of to whom the US 
intelligence agencies were responsible, under whose authority were assassinations plotted, 
and why Congress was not told of these intelligence activities.33 Even before the Church 
Committee began to push the White House to provide information regarding its 
relationship with the CIA, it concerned White House officials that one of the topics the 
Church Committee would be interested in was assassination plots involving foreign 
leaders. A memorandum of conversation from January of 1975 records President Ford and 
CIA Director Colby discussing allegations of CIA abuse and the threats posed by the 
congressional investigation. At the end of their conversation, President Ford remarked: 
President: We don’t want to destroy but to preserve the CIA. But we want to make 
sure that illegal operations and those outside the charter don’t happen. 
Colby: We have run operations to assassinate foreign leaders. We have never 
succeeded. [He cited Castro, Trujillo, General Schneider of Chile, et al]34 
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The three foreign leaders, including General Schneider, cited in this conversation 
were all included in the Church Committee’s interim report. This conversation recorded 
the White House’s early and continued preoccupation with a congressional investigation 
uncovering the true extent of the collaboration to plot assassination between the White 
House and CIA. 
In early March of 1975 Senator Church visited the White House to ask for 
documents to include in his investigation. The purpose of his visit was to formally notify 
President Ford and Secretary Kissinger that he would be investigating, among other issues, 
the allegations of CIA covert involvement in assassination plots involving foreign leaders 
around the world. The White House’s internal files were crucial to the investigation, as the 
Committee wanted to know what the White House knew about the assassination plots, and 
whether in any of the assassination plots it encouraged the CIA to act. Relations between 
the Church Committee and the White House got off to a cordial start, with President Ford 
accepting the Committee’s list of requested documents and promising to fulfill the 
Committee’s requests. Yet accepting a list of requested documents did not translate to 
actually providing them to the Committee. Declassified documents reveal that Secretary 
Kissinger was one of the major voices in the White House arguing against allowing the 
Committee too much access to White House documents. He looked for ways to limit the 
Committee’s investigation into the White House, acknowledging to President Ford in an 
Oval Office meeting in May of 1975: 
Kissinger: We have a problem with the Church Committee. They want to interview 
anyone in State they want, without a State Department officer present. I think there 
should be a White House order confirming that these interviews should be limited 
to Presidential appointees and on specific subjects. This goes to Executive 
Privilege… 
President Ford: Our problem is they have already done it with the CIA. 
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Kissinger: If we establish a precedent that Congressional committees can run loose 
in agencies - - that is worse than what McCarthy did… I think the Executive 
Branch is in serious trouble.35 
 
Secretary Kissinger’s reluctance to have the Committee digging into White House 
interactions with the CIA went beyond issues of executive privilege. Transcripts of 
Kissinger’s private conversations reveal his concern with one topic in particular: the White 
House’s involvement in assassination plots. The internal White House discussion involving 
General Schneider’s death signals the specific threat that this kidnapping plot posed since 
it directly implicated the Nixon White House and Kissinger in particular. In a June 1975 
telephone conversation with National Security Advisor Lieutenant General Brent 
Scowcroft, Kissinger emphatically states: 
Kissinger: He cannot pick Chile. 
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft: I said, what did you pick Chile for? He said Church is 
determined to go through with details. 
Kissinger: I'm determined to stop it. Why not pick one from a previous 
administration. 
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft: It's starting from 1962. He goes through the whole 
thing. 
Kissinger: Including Schneider? 
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft: Yes.36 
 
From the beginning of the Committee’s investigation the topic of assassination 
plots proved to be a contentious issue for the White House that officials did their best to try 
to avoid. In particular, the plot to assassinate General Schneider became a personal issue 
for Secretary Kissinger since the White House’s documentation of the kidnapping plot 
provided a clear example of how covert involvement in a foreign country could escalate to 
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become a concrete plot to kidnap a foreign leader. Additionally, the White House’s role in 
instructing the CIA to formulate this plot could be traced through previous documents like 
memorandums and transcripts of conversation. These detail the inner actions of the Nixon 
White House in 1970 with the CIA in regards to General Schneider and the situation in 
Chile leading up to Allende’s electoral ratification.  
At this stage in the Committee’s investigation, the Ford White House tried to delay 
delivering the documents that Senator Church requested from President Ford. Given 
Senator Church’s commitment to uncovering the whole truth during the course of his 
investigation, it is not surprising that staff member Loch Johnson remembered that he 
“complained strongly about executive-branch delays on document deliveries.”37 Chief 
Counsel Frederick A.O. Schwarz defined the ways the Committee pushed back against the 
White House’s reluctance to give up documents. First, the Committee put political pressure 
on the White House by using the media as its outlet for complaints about the White 
House’s unwillingness to cooperate.38 This also served to publicly reinforce the 
Committee’s resolve to conduct an investigation into White House abuse of the 
intelligence agencies. Second, it requested specific document from the White House and 
intelligence agencies. Finally, the Committee emphasized that its’ investigation timeline 
would continue to be extended until the White House supplied the requested documents. 
Democratic Committee member Senator Mondale remarked that the Committee “ought to 
tell them we’re going to keep getting extensions for the life of this committee until we 
finish our business” to which Republican Vice Chair Tower responded “Amen, world 
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without end.”39 The White House’s foot-dragging united the Church Committee members 
in their commitment to force the White House to hand over the requested documents with 
little regard for how long it took or the White House’s protestations over issues of secrecy. 
Issues of secrecy became the main point of contention for the White House and the 
Church Committee. Although the White House could not stop the Committee from 
obtaining the information it sought, the White House could work to stop the Committee 
from revealing it to anyone outside of the Committee. The White House and Church 
Committee had different ideas about what information should remain secret, and these 
differences led to another conflict centered on information surrounding assassination plots 
involving foreign leaders. The White House’s main action in pushing back against the 
Committee’s investigation, after it became apparent that it could not persuade or bully the 
Committee into giving up its investigation, was the invocation of secrecy. To the Church 
Committee there was a distinction between obtaining secret information and handling 
secret information.40 Working under the philosophy of practically handling secret 
information, the Committee negotiated with the Ford White House and came to an 
agreement acceptable to both sides. Chief counsel Frederick A.O. Schwarz detailed the 
secrecy arrangements as such:  
While it retained all final disclosure decisions, the Church Committee worked out 
reasonable secrecy arrangements with the Ford administration. When agencies first 
produced documents, they could redact— or black out— names of informers or 
secret agents… If, upon review, the committee believed disclosure was important, 
it could press for the names. The committee also agreed that, before it issued 
reports, it would let agencies and the White House see final drafts so they could 
argue that disclosure of particular information would be unnecessarily harmful. The 
committee’s published reports revealed huge amounts of classified information. No 
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improprieties were withheld, but sensible limits were placed on the details 
disclosed.41 
 
Although this arrangement complicated the Committee’s investigation, it did not 
interfere with its mission. Schwarz attributed the increasing trust of the Ford 
administration, and the US public, to the Committee’s ability to keep “its collective mouth 
shut.”42 One instance that demonstrates the Committee’s willingness to handle secret 
information in a responsible way was testimony regarding the plots to assassinate foreign 
leaders. This testimony could either be heard in public or executive (private) session.43 The 
testimonies would make for riveting reporting and television; they offered “dramatic, 
conflicting, and often emotional testimony” from CIA officials, executives, National 
Security Advisors, Cabinet secretaries, and presidential aides.44  
Yet Senator Church eventually convinced the Committee to hear these testimonies 
in executive session and preserve the secrecy surrounding CIA covert activities abroad. He 
recognized that public hearings would almost certainly derail the already limited 
cooperation between the Committee and the Ford White House. Although televised 
testimonies would have placed Senator Church in the spotlight, they would have also 
jeopardized the Ford administration’s cooperation.45 Besides, the Committee thought that 
sensitive details surrounding assassination plots involving foreign leaders could easily be 
included in a sanitized form in the Committee’s interim report. However, the secret nature 
of the details included in the interim report became a main point of contention between the 
Ford White House and the Church Committee. 
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 The interim report was a secrecy issue that the Committee and the Ford 
administration did not agree on. The debate between making the interim report public or 
private was one that neither the Church Committee nor the Ford administration were 
willing to negotiate on. This initiated a back-and-forth between the Church Committee and 
the Ford White House and CIA over the extent of the details to be removed before 
publication. The White House and the CIA tried to prevent publication of the interim 
report by claiming that the report revealed too many details that could endanger CIA 
officials. Within the White House, many of the officials who worked closely with 
President Ford protested the release of the interim report in full, including Secretary 
Kissinger and Chief of Staff Dick Cheney.46 As at the beginning of the Church 
Committee’s investigation into assassination plots involving foreign leaders, the 
investigation into the death of General Schneider concerned Secretary Kissinger. Unsure of 
the repercussions the public release of this information could have, Secretary Kissinger 
called former Secretary of State William Rogers and asked him: 
Secretary Kissinger: Bill what do you think the impact of these Chile revelations 
will be? Have you read it? 
 Secretary Rogers: Yes. I think they will be serious as I have said before… 
Secretary Rogers: …We have a task force quite frankly that is trying to think up 
ways to contain the damage. I am frank to say that it is going to hurt us.47 
 
                                                          
46 Ibid., 176-177; for more information on White House concerns over secrecy see also: Memorandum, 
Procedures for Safeguarding Classified Information, 04/14/1975, folder: Intelligence Investigations: Church 
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Open Hearing on Covert Activities in Chile, 11/01/1975, folder: Marsh, John O.: Files, 1974-1977, Box 1, 
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Library; Memorandum draft, Public Disclosure of Covert Action by the Senate Select Committee, n.d., 
folder: Marsh, John O.: Files, 1974-1977, Box 1, Ford Library Project File on Pinochet/Chile, GRFL. 
47 United States. Department of State. Secretary, “[Henry Kissinger's Visit to Latin America],” memorandum 
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Just as with the reveal by Senator Church that the death of General Schneider 
would be included in the Committee’s investigation, Secretary Kissinger confirmed his 
personal apprehension at the inclusion of Chile in the interim report. Secretary Kissinger’s 
inability to stop Senator Church from investigating General Schneider’s death and 
including it in the interim report left him to deal with the aftermath of the report to the best 
of his ability. 
 Beyond Secretary Kissinger’s personal concern at the inclusion of General 
Schneider’s death, the Ford White House was also against the release of the interim report 
due to other details. The comprehensive nature of the interim report meant that it exposed, 
in great detail, the worst examples of covert activities abroad during the past four 
presidencies.48 The argument from the Ford White House that the interim report should not 
be made public forced Senator Church to take drastic action. At a Committee meeting 
leading up to the report’s release, Senator Church threatened to resign if the interim report 
was not made public.49 Shocked, the other Committee members held a rare vote and 
overwhelmingly voted to release the report to the public.50 With the decision made that the 
interim report would be released publicly, the Ford White House continued to fight against 
the inclusion of certain details. Beyond the fundamental complaint that the report revealed 
too much about covert activities, the Ford White House protested many of the details 
included in the report.51 Of particular concern to the Ford White House was the inclusion 
of the names of high-level CIA officials, while the report replaced the names of low-level 
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CIA officials with pseudonyms.52 The tension culminated with an executive session in the 
Senate, where the Church Committee brought the issue in front of the entire Senate body 
after describing the nature of the report. After discussing the matter, the Senate found no 
need to vote on the matter since there was no vocal opposition to the release. At the end of 
the session, the Church Committee released the interim report in full, without removing 
any names from the interim report.53 
Out of the Church Committee’s entire investigation, covering a wide range of 
covert activities inside the US and abroad, only the investigation into assassination plots 
involving foreign leaders produced a variety of reports beyond the seven books and seven 
volumes. The interim report Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders and 
the staff report Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 were the only interim and staff reports 
published on any topic. This was in addition to the volume on the hearings for covert 
action and the book on foreign and military intelligence. Although the release of the 
interim report was met with opposition from the Ford White House, its overall begrudging 
cooperation and deliberate delays eventually resulted in the Church Committee receiving 
the materials for its investigation. The context of Gerald Ford’s presidency ultimately 
forced him to cooperate with the investigation. After the Watergate scandal and Richard 
Nixon’s disgraced presidency, President Ford needed to appear open and cooperative with 
investigative bodies like the Church Committee. Nixon’s presidency continued to cast a 
shadow over the Ford White House as Congress conducted its season of inquiry.54 
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Ultimately, the concern over the Committee accusing the Ford White House of 
withholding information from its investigation outweighed the apprehension over the 
Committee digging into US covert activities. 
 
The Committee’s Interim Report and its Findings 
On November 20, 1975, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities published its interim report Alleged 
Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.55 The Church Committee’s report was the 
culmination of one part of its broader investigation that when completed extended over 
fourteen reports covering the various actions undertaken by the CIA, FBI, and NSA that it 
investigated between 1975 and 1976. 
The Church Committee’s report on assassination plots involving foreign leaders set out 
to answer four main questions regarding assassination plots, their authorization, and who 
was in control of authorizing them. The first question was about assassination plots: did 
US officials instigate, attempt, aid and abet, or acquiesce in plots to assassinate foreign 
leaders? Centered on US covert involvement in other killings, the second question asked: 
did US officials assist foreign dissidents in a way which significantly contributed to the 
killing of foreign leaders? The third question referred to the authorization of the plots: 
where there was involvement by US official in assassination plots or other killings, were 
such activities authorized and if so, at what levels of our government? The last question 
was about communication and control: even if not authorized, were the assassination 
activities perceived by those involved to be within the scope of their lawful authority? If 
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they were so perceived, was there inadequate control exercised by higher authorities over 
the agencies to prevent such misinterpretation?56 
The Church Committee then applied these four questions to the five alleged 
assassination plots involving foreign leaders it examined. The Committee investigated 
possible assassination plots against Patrice Lumumba of Congo, Fidel Castro of Cuba, 
Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, and 
General René Schneider of Chile. The report concluded that the US attempted, but failed, 
to assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba. The US plot to kill Patrice Lumumba 
only failed because another group assassinated him before the US could act. It also 
concluded that the deaths of Rafael Trujillo, Ngo Dinh Diem, and General René Schneider 
were at the hands of dissidents that the US supported, but there was no direct US 
involvement in their deaths. Although the Committee determined that the US was not 
directly responsible for any of the four deaths, it concluded that the CIA was on friendly 
terms with the plotters and facilitated the transfer of weapons to supply them for the 
various plots.57 The plots surrounding General Schneider, Fidel Castro, and Rafael Trujillo 
are connected by their geographic location in Latin America. This is another reminder of 
the geopolitical importance of Latin America to the US during the Cold War. The first 
attempt by the US to stop a communist intrusion in Latin America was to plot to 
assassinate Fidel Castro so he could not inspire any other leaders in the region to follow in 
his revolutionary path.58 Yet the report demonstrates that this would not be the last attempt 
by the US. The interim report explicitly states that while these examples must be viewed 
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within the context of the Cold War, this “cannot justify resorting to the kind of abuses 
covered in this report.”59 These five examples are representative of a longer pattern of 
forceful US intervention in other countries to protect them, in the US’ eyes, from the threat 
of communism posed by their leaders. 
The choice of the five assassination plots to investigate also illustrates Senator Church 
and his Committee’s bipartisan nature. The plots involving General Schneider and Patrice 
Lumumba occurred during the Republican presidencies of Richard Nixon and Dwight 
Eisenhower, respectively. The plots involving Rafael Trujillo, Ngo Dinh Diem, and Fidel 
Castro occurred during the Democratic presidency of John F. Kennedy, and additional CIA 
abuses occurred during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency.60 Senator Church did not hold the 
Committee back from investigating assassination plots during the presidencies of fellow 
Democrats. 
The questions that the Church Committee set out to answer about the authority 
behind CIA assassination plots involving foreign leaders embroiled the White House in a 
controversy about the limits of executive privilege. Those working on the Committee saw 
its investigation as marking the end of the “imperial presidency of Richard Nixon.”61 
Senator Church later characterized a relationship between the CIA and the presidency 
where “The CIA operated as an arm of the presidency. This led presidents to conclude that 
they were ‘super-godfathers’ with enforcers. It made them feel above the law and 
unaccountable.”62 Although the report ultimately concluded that the US was not directly 
responsible for any of the successful assassination plots, it made it clear that the White 
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House had been involved in plotting kidnappings, assassinations, and coups. The release of 
the interim report confirmed suspicions in Congress and the press that the White House 
plotted assassinations or kidnappings of foreign leaders on multiple occasions. Although 
President Ford was not in office when the assassination plots took place, he was left to 
address the allegations of wrongdoing that the White House now faced from the Church 
Committee. 
In its findings on the death of General Schneider, the Committee focused on 
critiquing the relationship between the CIA and White House when it came to covert 
activities. With evidence that the CIA did follow through on Kissinger’s orders to turn off 
the kidnapping plot, the committee found that it suggested “an unduly lax attitude within 
the CIA toward consultation with superiors.”63 The interim report believed this was due in 
part to the White House’s practice of giving the CIA a “blank check” when it came to 
covert operations.64 The case of General Schneider’s botched kidnapping and death 
demonstrates the problems that arise from lack of supervision over covert activities. The 
CIA failed to follow Kissinger’s orders to turn off US support to the plotters, leading to 
confusion and uncertainty over the US’ intended and actual course of action in the days 
leading up to his death. 
As a select committee, the Church Committee did not have the power to make 
laws, but it could make recommendations to the executive and legislative branches. Its 
findings from the interim report led to the recommendation that all political assassinations 
be prohibited by the executive branch, and no efforts be taken to overthrow or subvert a 
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democratically-elected government.65 Legislative branch reforms also came from 
recommendations made by the Church Committee, and led to the establishment of the 
permanent Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. For the first time in US history, the 
Senate had a committee dedicated to conducting congressional oversight of the intelligence 
agencies.66 The committee’s mission states that it will “provide vigilant legislative 
oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that such activities are 
in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”67 No longer relegated 
to the Committee on Armed Services, congressional oversight of the intelligence agencies 
was now out in the open with a dedicated committee to make sure that oversight was no 
longer in name only. 
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Conclusion 
The interim report released by the Church Committee lead to concrete changes in 
the control and conduct of covert activities abroad. These changes occurred in both the 
executive branch and legislative branch, and together they lead to reforms in the way that 
the intelligence agencies, White House, and Congress interacted. Looking back at his time 
working with the Church Committee, Chief Counsel Frederick A.O. Schwarz recalled its 
mission “to understand the past and to propose guidance for the future,” and in order to do 
that “a congressional committee must investigate past wrongdoing and mistakes.”1 The 
Church Committee investigated some of the worst wrongdoing and mistakes by the US 
intelligence agencies, with the end goal of offering recommendations for appropriate and 
effective reforms. The Cold War could no longer be used as a justification for the misuse 
of the intelligence agencies by the White House. The CIA, among other intelligence 
agencies, was not created to carry out the White House’s desired covert activities abroad. 
What the Church Committee’s investigation uncovered served as a “cautionary note” to the 
White House, executive branch, and members of Congress of what happened when they 
failed to provide adequate oversight of the intelligence agencies.2 
As riveting as the Committee’s investigation into assassination plots involving 
foreign leaders is on its own, the full narrative of the examples chosen for the interim 
report adds a new layer of significance to the Committee’s final results. As this paper has 
tried to show, the case of General Schneider provided the Church Committee with a crucial 
component of their interim report. Although the investigation uncovered that he was not 
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the target of an assassination plot, the true circumstance of his death was no less shocking 
than an assassination plot. As demonstrated throughout this paper, the context of the Cold 
War allowed the events leading up to the death of General Schneider. However, the season 
of inquiry beginning in 1975 elevated General Schneider’s death from another skeleton in 
the Nixon White House’s closet to one of five central examples of US covert activities 
against foreign leaders. 
Chapter 1 set the stage for US covert involvement in Chile leading to the botched 
kidnapping and subsequent assassination of General Schneider. The US ignored its claims 
of promoting peace, liberty, and democracy abroad and instead engaged in actions that 
went directly against these claims. The US’ engagement in covert action against 
democratically-elected Salvador Allende is just one compelling example of the lengths the 
US went to “protect” the world as a result of Cold War tensions. The death of General 
Schneider occurred because the US made an overt attempt to impede the ratification of 
Allende’s electoral victory, yet failed due to a serious of miscommunications among the 
White House, CIA, and coup plotters that led to General Schneider’s botched kidnapping. 
However, this failed plot to kidnap General Schneider and stop Allende’s ratification led to 
primary sources from the Nixon White House that proved invaluable evidence in the 
Church Committee’s investigation.  
Chapter 2 set the stage for the formation of the Church Committee with the multi-
year process of introducing the topic of US covert involvement in Chile to the Senate, and 
the championing of the necessity of this investigation by Senator Frank Church. The 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ questioning of Henry Kissinger showed that it 
was not easy to make the White House accept that it had to face the reality of an 
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investigation into intelligence abuses perpetrated by the White House. The failure of the 
Rockefeller Commission and limited scope of the Pike Committee demonstrate that even 
the investigative bodies struggled to form a good investigation due to issues of 
communication and competition. The Church Committee’s investigation did not occur in 
isolation, and previous committees and their simultaneous investigations helped Senator 
Church shape a better committee of his own. Indeed, the demands by Congress and the 
public for accountability in the White House were a key part of the Church Committee’s 
existence and wide-ranging investigation that set out to uncover the full range of 
intelligence agencies’ abuses in the US and abroad.  
Chapter 3 brings in the Church Committee’s investigation of the death of General 
Schneider and the creation of the interim report on alleged assassination plots involving 
foreign leaders. His death connects the two different threads of US covert involvement in 
Chile and assassination plots involving foreign leaders. It allowed the Church Committee 
to engage with the topic of US covert involvement in Chile, already of interest to Senator 
Church from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearings, within the broader 
investigation into assassination plots. The Church Committee’s inclusion of General 
Schneider’s death in its investigation demonstrates the moment of serious inquiry into 
intelligence activities that sought to end the White House’s practice of using the CIA as a 
means to carry out covert operations. Documents contemporary with the Committee’s 
investigation reveal that the Committee’s inclusion of General Schneider’s death was a 
serious point of contention for Henry Kissinger. At his urging, the Ford White House 
pushed back against the Committee including the death of General Schneider in its 
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investigation. Yet the Church Committee was not swayed by their opposition, and it still 
included the death of General Schneider in their interim report. 
The Church Committee had no way of knowing the simultaneous actions of the 
White House while the investigation occurred. Every action by the Committee had a 
parallel reaction in the White House, and the White House’s reactions provide some of the 
most compelling evidence about the White House’s anxiety towards the investigation. The 
White House publicly wrote off their anxiety as concerns over the protection of secrets that 
could harm the intelligence agencies. In the case of General Schneider’s death, however, 
this went beyond simple anxiety that the interim report might reveal national secrets to the 
public. Evidence relating to General Schneider’s death hit even closer to home; it was a 
personal liability for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Secretary Kissinger was afraid of 
what it revealed about how recently the US participated in covert activities abroad, when 
he was already working in the White House as a top aide to President Nixon. The same 
documents that the Church Committee requested for their investigation implicated him in 
being involved in General Schneider’s botched kidnapping. 
One change emerging from the Church Committee’s investigation into the death of 
General Schneider was that his death cracked the door open on Henry Kissinger’s previous 
actions during Nixon’s imperial presidency, revealing them to the US public. The days of 
the imperial presidency ended with Nixon’s resignation, and the Ford White House now 
realized that the days of unbridled executive power were over. Henry Kissinger had to deal 
with the fallout from the imperial presidency when the Church Committee began to inquire 
about past covert activities that he was extensively involved in. Although it took five years, 
the death of General Schneider eventually played a key role in revealing the US imperial 
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presidency to the US public. The death of General Schneider occurred in a void of 
congressional inquiry, with no oversight of the intelligence agencies and their relationship 
with the White House. Five years later, increased congressional oversight allowed the 
Church Committee’s inquiry into General Schneider’s death to finally take place. 
The death of General Schneider and the Church Committee’s investigation into his 
death had lasting implications for Henry Kissinger and the broader intelligence agencies. 
Following the recommendations of the Church Committee, President Ford issued 
Executive Order 11905. This executive order was the White House’s attempt to reform the 
intelligence agencies following the recommendations suggested by the Committee. With 
this executive order, the US formally banned assassinations of foreign leaders for the first 
time: “No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to 
engage in, political assassination.”3 This executive order, along with the creation of the 
House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence, were the most prominent 
institutional reforms stemming from the Church Committee and its interim report.  
Although General Schneider’s death was not the straw that broke the camel’s back 
for Henry Kissinger, the Church Committee’s revelations into his role in the death did 
further tarnish his reputation. Before the interim report Kissinger could operate in the 
shadows of the White House, with only those closest to him on the inside knowing his 
involvement in covert activities. After the report, his ability to operate without others 
questioning him ended. Although never forced to explain his past actions in a court of law, 
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the revelations of his past involvement in covert activities made the US public change their 
opinion of one of the country’s most well-known and long-standing political figures.  
Ultimately, Kissinger’s involvement in the botched kidnapping that led to General 
Schneider’s death did get him the closest he ever came to answering for his past actions in 
court. On September 10, 2001 General Schneider’s sons filed a complaint against the 
United States and Henry Kissinger for allowing the death of their father by never giving 
any instruction to the plotters to leave General Schneider unharmed. A number of major 
news sources picked up this story, but their attention lasted for only one day.4 The next 
day, September 11, a date that would become significant for both Chileans in 1973 and 
Americans in 2001, this story was overshadowed by national tragedy.  
The story of Henry Kissinger being called to answer for his role in General 
Schneider’s death ended three years later on March 30, 2004. The US District Court for the 
District of Columbia dismissed the case against the United States and Henry Kissinger, 
declaring that Henry Kissinger enjoyed sovereign immunity as National Security Advisor 
and the court could not rule on matters of foreign policy.5 Although the judicial system 
never held Henry Kissinger legally accountable for his actions, the Church Committee 
revealed them to the US public in the midst of a season of inquiry. General René 
Schneider’s death will not be forgotten; it will remain as an indisputable example of US 
foreign covert involvement that helped to bring about a change in the way the US oversees 
its intelligence agencies. 
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A 1972 Herblock Cartoon, © The Herb Block Foundation 
 
Block No. 7930 
Block, Herbert. “First the good news, Mr. President -- you wanted that 
[dollar sign] 400,000 contribution story off the front pages ...” 
Drawing. March 23, 1972. From Library of Congress Prints and 
Photographs Division: Cartoon Drawings: Herblock Collection. 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2012638085/. 
 
A 1974 Herblock Cartoon, © The Herb Block Foundation 
 
Block No. 8542 
Block, Herbert. “It's common practice to interfere with other 
governments -- if they're elected, that is.” Drawing. September 27, 
1974. From Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division: 
Cartoon Drawings: Herblock Collection. 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2012638427/. 
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A 1976 Herblock Cartoon, © The Herb Block Foundation 
 
Block No. 8851 
Block, Herbert. “Thank goodness, I have an expert navigator like you, 
Henry, or I'd be in trouble.” Drawing. January 1, 1976. From Library 
of Congress Prints and Photographs Division: Cartoon Drawings: 
Herblock Collection. http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2012638441/. 
 
“A 1976 Herblock Cartoon, © The Herb Block Foundation” 
 
Block No. 8863 
Block, Herbert. “[State Department door with Kissinger on seal of 
State Department].” Drawing. January 21, 1976. From Library of 
Congress Prints and Photographs Division: Cartoon Drawings: 
Herblock Collection. http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2012639449/. 
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